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____________________________________________________________________________________

Letter from the Department of Political Science
The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth
University is proud to present the inaugural issue of its undergraduate
political science research journal, The Ramerican Political Science Review.
This journal presents some of the best undergraduate work produced by
students at VCU, plus a notable piece of work that was conducted by an
outside researcher (Towson University) and presented at VCU’s annual
Political Science Student Research Conference.
The research articles selected for publication in this issue address
questions of normative and scholarly importance. In the wake of this
summer’s Brexit vote, the questions posed by Lindsay April’s research on
European far-right electoral victories resonate strongly. And considering
the ever contentious relationship between majority rule and minority
rights, the questions posed by Grace Wald’s research on the public’s
influence on judicial rulings are pertinent to understanding the very real
stakes of political institutional design.
They encompass questions across sub-fields and use a variety of
theoretical approaches and political science methods.
Using an
experimental survey, Travis Brandon investigates the effects of social
media memes on Americans’ levels of political knowledge and political
tolerance, while Danielle Austen uses over four decades of data from the
General Social Survey to explore the correlative relationship between
support for the death penalty, and individuals’ levels of authoritarianism,
confidence in government institutions, and fear of crime.
We hope that these articles not only help to provide better
understanding of relevant questions concerning the state of our politics,
domestically and abroad, but also that they help inspire new questions for
our readers. For example, Jeff Martindale’s research asks us to consider
how the public sector can capitalize on recent privatized transportation
innovations in order to combat currently inefficient public transportation
options for spatially-mismatched workers in their communities.
Furthermore, we hope that the work of this issue’s researchers will
encourage other students to conduct their own political science research,
and to submit it for consideration to The Ramerican Political Science Review
next year, whether exploring American politics, international relations,
comparative politics, public policy or political theory.
3

While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science
and the contributions of our alumni, the final product is the work of a
student editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a doubleblind fashion. Over sixty submissions were received and reviewed by the
editors. The researchers featured in this issue went through a “revise and
resubmit” process, wherein they made content and style changes that
were requested by the editorial staff. The articles were then edited once
more by the editorial staff prior to publication. This final product is a
testament to their immense efforts during the summer months. The
Department of Political Science would, therefore, like to thank this year’s
editorial staff:
Julia Carney, Class of 2017
Atom Foltz, Class of 2018
Mariah Hines, Class of 2017
Lejla Libic, Class of 2016
The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr.
Alexandra Reckendorf for founding this publication, and for advising our
student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing
submissions and formatting this journal.
VCU Department of Political Science
August 2016
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Web of Lies: The Impact of Misinformation Found on Social Media
Travis Brandon, Virginia Commonwealth University
The popularity of the Internet and various forms of social media
has exploded over the past decade. Well-studied topics such as the spread
of misinformation, political knowledge, and tolerance, have just begun to
be researched, in social media interactions. A number of scholars have
argued that users of social media rarely have online interactions with those
holding opposite ideological viewpoints (Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith
2013; Jacobsen, Myung, & Johnson, 2015). Several others have explored
the possible consequences of this absence of cross-ideological interaction
as well (Stroud, 2010; Prior, 2013; Levendusky, 2013; Tewksbury & Riles,
2015). Other researchers have found evidence that misinformation is
easily spread on the web, and that despite an increase in the quantity of
public information sources, no change in the level of political knowledge
has been observed amongst the general populace (Prior, 2005; Nyhan &
Reifler, 2010; Hochschild & Einstein, 2015; Rojecki & Meraz, 2016). In
contrast to these claims, some studies have made claims that online media
increases the likelihood of cross-ideological interactions, and have shown
an ambiguous or even positive effect on political knowledge (Messing &
Westwood, 2012; Hollander, 2014; Dimitrova, Shehata, & Stromback, 2014;
Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006). Still, the rampant spread of misinformation
through social media sites suggests that these sites are unlikely to be
channels of political knowledge and social tolerance. Although research
regarding the relationship between the spread of misinformation and the
use of online media is relatively new, the majority of research has shown
that people are more likely to accept false information if it adheres to their
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ideology and more likely to reject true information if it opposes their
ideology.
Race, gender, religious affiliation, education, and socioeconomic
status are some of the many factors that influence political knowledge and
tolerance (Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Typically, those in poverty or with low
income levels show the lowest levels of political knowledge as they often
have less education as well as reduced access to mediums that could
potentially increase knowledge (Carpini & Keeter, 1996). However, political
knowledge, specifically knowledge related to civil liberties in a liberal
democracy, has been shown to be the most significant factor in explaining
tolerance (Carpini & Keeter, 1996). The way individuals interpret
information and form opinions, values, and attitudes, are significantly
influenced by cultural norms, personal experiences, and other social factors
(Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

Currently, research looking specifically at

tolerance, misinformation, knowledge, and social media, has yet to be
conducted.
There are several studies on misinformation, knowledge, and the
Internet which were pertinent to the research question. The first school of
thought relates to misinformation and knowledge and made an important
distinction between the two. Prior (2005) argued that as people gain
greater media choice, they subsequently gain political knowledge. Media
in this sense was defined as access to cable or satellite television or the
Internet (Prior, 2005). A major caveat to Prior’s claim was that people
choose among numerous options when watching television or surfing the
web.

People typically choose between either entertainment or news

(Prior, 2005). Prior (2005) conducted surveys in which people were asked
to rank different genres of media by favorability. The results showed that
6
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over time, those who preferred entertainment and gained access to
greater media choice, consumed less news and lost political knowledge
(Prior, 2005). Similarly, results showed that over time, those who preferred
news and gained access to greater media choice, consumed more news
and improved their political knowledge (Prior, 2005).

Knowledge is

important, because when people believe incorrect information, it can be
surprisingly hard to dissuade them (Hochschild & Einstein, 2015; Nyhan &
Reifler, 2010).
In addition, the aforementioned research expounds upon the
relationship between willingness to believe misinformation and a person’s
political ideology. Hochschild and Einstein (2015) pointed out numerous
examples of falsities that continue to be believed by significant portions of
the population; such examples include claims that Barack Obama was not
born in the United States, that vaccines cause autism, and that the U.S.
found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Most pertinent to the research
question were the ideological differences found in those questioning the
authenticity of Obama’s birth certificate.

Among Republicans, greater

proportions of people self-identifying as strongly Republican believed
Obama was born outside the U.S.; people who self-identified as weak
Republican were less likely to believe this claim (Hochschild & Einstein,
2015). Even though the vast majority of Democrats disagreed with this
statement, self-identifying weak Democrats were more likely to believe it
than strong Democrats (Hochschild & Einstein, 2015).
It is imperative to establish a definition of the word misperception
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Misperceptions are beliefs that refute widely
established opinions that have been backed by numerous experts and
substantial evidence (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Nyhan and Reifler (2010)
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argued that there is an essential ideological aspect to misperceptions;
people will be more likely to believe false information if it confirms their
viewpoints. An additional component of this ideological aspect is the term
“backfire effect”, which Nyhan and Reifler (2010) defined as a
phenomenon wherein “individuals who receive unwelcome information
may not simply resist challenges to their views. Instead they may come to
support their original opinion even more strongly” (p. 307). Nyhan and
Reifler (2010) conducted experiments in which conservatives continued to
believe false statements, even when shown correct factual information.
The stronger conservatives were more likely to believe the false
information after being shown the correction, supporting the idea of the
backfire effect (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Adding to this research, Rojecki
and Meraz (2016) investigated two cases in which misperceptions that
originated on the Internet, spread quickly and were even reported on by
cable television news.
The second area of study that related to the research question
could be termed the partisan proliferation school. A major component of
this school is selective exposure, covered in detail by Stroud.

While

selective exposure was not part of the research question that was
proposed, it was pertinent nonetheless; partisan selective exposure occurs
when people with firm ideological views choose media that agrees with
their views (Stroud, 2010). Stroud (2010) argued that increased media
choice via the Internet would lead to increased polarization. In a study,
Stroud (2010) found that across all forms of media, including newspaper,
television, radio, and the Internet, selective exposure was a prevalent
phenomenon. Himelboim et al. (2013) built on the research conducted by
Stroud and found that selective exposure was taking place on Twitter. The
8
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researchers identified clusters, or groups of tightly connected users, that
formed the Twitter equivalent of a social network (Himelboim et al., 2013).
Using keywords related to relevant political controversies, the clusters
were found to be ideologically homogeneous (Himelboim et al., 2013).
Jacobsen et.al. (2015) found selective exposure on the social media site
Facebook as well. Jacobsen et al. (2015) examined links posted on the
walls of ideologically opposite shows, such as the O’Reilly Factor and the
Rachel Maddow Show, and discovered that conservatives overwhelmingly
post links to conservative sites, with similarly homogeneous behavior for
liberals via the Maddow Facebook Wall. Furthermore, even when posted
links led to ideologically opposite sites, the purpose was often meant to
show sarcasm, incredulity, or humor (Jacobsen et al., 2015).
The consequences of selective exposure via the Internet and social
media could be profound.

Levendusky (2013) showed that selective

exposure could indeed lead to increased polarization. In an experiment,
conservatives were shown clips from the conservative news channel, Fox
News, while liberals were shown video clips from MSNBC and The Rachel
Maddow Show (Levendusky, 2013). The results showed decreased levels of
bipartisanship, and lowered levels of cross-ideological trust in both liberals
and conservative groups after watching the ideologically similar clips
(Levedusky, 2013). Likewise, Prior (2013) stated that people who hold
strong ideological views are becoming increasingly extreme and that the
cause of this is the proliferation of slanted media sources that cater to the
extremes. Prior (2013) argued that these polarized extremes, or elites, are
more likely to vote and to spread polarization into politics via elections.
The final school of thought relating to the research question
presents the view that the Internet and, by extension, social media may
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actually increase political knowledge and provide more opportunities for
cross-ideological interactions.
potential positives.

This view is often called the school of

Hollander (2014) found that people who often

consume news on the Internet have increased levels of recall knowledge.
This is significant because recall knowledge, as opposed to recognition
knowledge, requires a more thorough understanding of the information at
hand (Hollander, 2014). Messing and Westwood (2014) argued against the
research that claims the Internet increases selective exposure. Highlighting
social media in particular, the researchers explained that social
endorsements, as opposed to ideology, are more important when users
are choosing news sources (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Messing and
Westwood (2014) pointed out that social media users are exposed to a
wide variety of news sources, from different ideological perspectives.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) agreed and argued that Internet users are
exposed to ideologically heterogeneous content.
All three schools of thought had a number of strengths and
weaknesses. One weakness that affected nearly all schools to some extent
was that very few studies looked specifically at social media. To counter
this, studies that pertained to the Internet and other closely related forms
of media were chosen. The misinformation and knowledge school, along
with the partisan proliferation school; while different, are closely related.
Stroud (2010) explains this perfectly,
Those with higher levels of political knowledge are better able to
detect partisan cues that could lead them to select politically
likeminded media and to develop polarized attitudes. Those with
higher levels of political knowledge also may be better able to
counterargue the information, thus yielding polarization even in
10
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the face of contradictory information. Furthermore, the more
information respondents have in favor of their opinion, the more
certain they may feel about their opinion. Those with stronger
partisan attachments are more motivated to select politically
likeminded media, to process information in ways that support
their existing partisan predispositions, and to hold their attitudes
with certainty (p. 562).
While this assertion may be incorrect, it was the inspiration for the
research question that was proposed.
Additionally, very little research was found supporting the third
school of thought. While the argument by Westwood and Messing (2014)
was compelling, Himelboim et al. (2013); and Jacobsen et al. (2015);
showed that users, despite being exposed to cross-ideological content,
politically interacted with others in a homogeneous network. It was this
research, along with the other research contained within the first two
schools, that most closely pertained to the research question, and which
could be considered most adept at answering it.
The Political Ideology Factor
Prior research has established that people often reject ideologically
opposite information even when it is true and often accept ideologically
affirming information even when it is false, which can inhibit the growth of
political knowledge and propagate misconceptions.

Research has also

shown that politically minded users of the Internet rarely interact with
others who hold opposing political views and that the politically invested
seek out information on the web that is geared toward their ideology. This
phenomenon, known as selective exposure, has been shown to decrease
levels of tolerance toward opposite ideologies. Finally, misinformation is
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commonly circulated on the web and social media, and research has shown
that the majority of the web accessing public has seen a minimal increase,
at best, in political knowledge resulting from the Internet. Thus, in a social
media context, conservatives and liberals would be expected to more
readily accept ideologically confirming false information as accurate, and
both liberals and conservatives would be expected to more easily reject
ideologically opposing true information as inaccurate. When exposed to
ideologically opposing false misinformation in a social media context, it
would be expected that liberals and conservatives would readily identify
the information as such. What remained to be examined was whether
there were differences in the levels of tolerance between liberals and
conservatives when they were exposed to ideologically opposite false
information, and how knowledge levels related to misinformation; if there
was a relationship at all.
How to Solve the Social Media and Misinformation Dilemma
Ideological bias plays an important role in the spread of political
misinformation on social media, and has a negative impact on political
knowledge. To test the hypotheses and determine the impact that the
independent variable, misinformation found on social media, had on the
dependent variables, knowledge and tolerance, the researcher utilized a
survey experiment. The goal of the survey experiment was to collect
meaningful data that would test the hypotheses, and that would show the
differences, if there were any, in levels of tolerance between the political
ideologies when exposed to ideologically opposite misinformation. The
survey experiment was also utilized with the hope that it would provide
data that could help determine if there were ideological differences in
knowledge and recognition of misinformation. In conceptualizing the
12
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independent variable, social media was defined as cell phone apps or web
pages where users interact with each other to communicate and exchange
information, ideas, thoughts, and interests; as well as share news, pictures,
and videos. Examples include websites and smartphone apps such as
Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Reddit, and Instagram.

To complete the

conceptualization of the independent variable, misinformation found on
social media was defined as factually incorrect information that pertained
to American politics; that could be posted and shared on social media sites.
To operationalize the independent variable, political memes found on the
Internet that contained factually incorrect or correct information were
utilized. Internet memes are a form of media, often presented in the form
of an image that may contain words, catchphrases, and other information
that can be shared and circulated across the web via various platforms.
Memes are commonly found and shared on social media sites and
represented the best way to conceptualize the independent variable given
the limitations of this study.
How to Define and Assess Knowledge
In conceptualizing the first dependent variable, knowledge was
defined as the ability to identify information that pertained to American
politics as factual or incorrect, as well as the ability to correctly answer
questions that pertained to American politics.

To operationalize this

dependent variable, survey respondents were asked a knowledge question
that closely related to the information found in the memes.
The first knowledge question for conservatives corresponded with
the ideologically reinforcing meme containing false information (Figure 1).
Respondents were asked: “Which of the following statements is true?”
with the following answer choices: since taking office, the job market for
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Black Americans has improved under Barack Obama; since taking office,
the job market for Black Americans has gotten worse under Barack Obama;
since taking office, the job market for Black Americans hasn’t changed
under Barack Obama. The second knowledge question for conservatives
corresponded with the ideologically opposing meme containing accurate
information (Figure 2).

The question was phrased: “Roughly 40% of

Americans who receive food stamps…” with the answer choices being:
White; Black or African American; Hispanic or Latino; Asian.

To help

measure the first dependent variable, the answer choices were coded
dichotomously, where 1=correct response and 0=incorrect response. So
for the first question, 1=since taking office, the job market for Black
Americans has improved under Barack Obama; for the second question
1=White.
The first knowledge question for liberals corresponded with the
ideologically reinforcing meme containing false information (Figure 3).
Respondents were asked “On which of the following does the U.S. federal
government currently spend the least?” with the answer choices being:
national defense; social security; foreign aid; welfare programs.

The

second knowledge question for liberals corresponded with the ideologically
opposing meme containing inaccurate information (Figure 4). Respondents
were asked, “Which of the following statements is true?” with the answer
choices being: in 2011, more Americans were killed by clubs or hammers
than rifles of any kind; in 2011, more Americans were killed by rifles of any
kind than clubs or hammers; no data was collected to determine whether
more Americans were killed by clubs or hammers, or rifles of any kind, in
2011. To help measure the first dependent variable, the answer choices
were coded so they could be arranged dichotomously, where 1=correct
14
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response and 0=incorrect response. For the first question 1=foreign aid;
for the second question 1=in 2011, more Americans were killed by clubs or
hammers than rifles of any kind.
Accuracy: Testing the Hypotheses
In conceptualizing the second dependent variable, accuracy was
defined as correctly identifying information in a meme as accurate or
inaccurate. To operationalize this second dependent variable, respondents
were asked to assess the accuracy of the information provided in the
different memes.
For the validity questions, respondents rated the accuracy of the
information in the memes by being asked: “Look at the image above. Is the
information in the image…” and then were asked to rate the information as
one of the following: definitely accurate; probably accurate; probably
inaccurate; definitely inaccurate.

To measure the second dependent

variable, the answer choices were coded and arranged on an ordinal scale
where: 4=definitely accurate, 3=probably accurate, 2=probably inaccurate,
and 1=definitely inaccurate.
Tolerance: Defining the Final Dependent Variable
In conceptualizing the third dependent variable, tolerance was
defined as neutral or positive feelings toward the opposite ideology. To
operationalize this final dependent variable, survey respondents were
asked about their feelings toward the opposite ideology.

Further

operationalization of this dependent variable was defined as respondents
who have neutral or positive feelings toward the ideology that is opposite
to their own.
To operationalize tolerance, respondents in each group viewed an
ideologically opposing meme containing false information and were asked:
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“How much, if at all, do you like or dislike liberals/conservatives?” and
were then given the following options: like a great deal; like a moderate
amount; like a little; neither like nor dislike; dislike a little; dislike a
moderate amount; dislike a great deal. To measure the third dependent
variable, the answer choices were coded and arranged on an ordinal scale
where: 7=dislike a great deal, 6=dislike a moderate amount, 5=dislike a
little, 4=neither like nor dislike, 3=like a little, 2=like a moderate amount,
and 1=like a great deal.
Ideology: A Wide Range of Choices & Addressing the Moderate Problem
The ideologies that were utilized in this study were conservatives
and liberals, defined in the context of American politics. These ideological
labels were chosen, as opposed to major political party labels, because the
number of Americans who describe themselves as independent from the
major political parties continues to grow, and because large proportions of
young people identify as politically independent.
Because ideology is an important component in how it relates to
the independent variable, the first question on the survey asked all
respondents to identify their political views. Respondents were offered the
options: extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, neither liberal nor
conservative,

slightly

conservative,

conservative,

or

extremely

conservative. This was done to provide respondents with a number of
options with which they could identify their political ideology, and that
aided in determining whether there were differences between the slight,
moderate, and extreme respondents.
For the purposes of this study and to keep them from being
excluded, the respondents who chose the option of neither liberal nor
conservative were directed to a separate page where they were asked: “If
16
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you had to choose, would you say you lean more liberal, or would you say
you lean more conservative?” After the middle of the road respondents
chose either conservative or liberal, they completed the remainder of the
survey in the same fashion as the other liberals and conservatives.
Survey Experiment: Gathering Data Without Using Social Media
Conservative respondents first received a meme geared toward
their ideology, but that contained false information (Figure 1). The meme
contains a picture of an African American man wearing a t-shirt that states
‘I need a job’ with the U.S. Capitol in the background and contains
information that makes inaccurate claims about Black unemployment
under Barack Obama and Ronald Reagan. The conservative respondents
were then asked a validity question and a knowledge question to address
the corresponding dependent variables.

The conservative group then

viewed a liberal meme containing true information (Figure 2). The meme
contains a picture of a child that looks “poor” and the information claims
that the vast majority of the poorest counties in the U.S. are located in
predominantly conservative states, which is true. That was followed by
separate validity and knowledge questions, which rounded out the
operationalization of the corresponding dependent variables for the
conservative group. Thus, these two memes and the corresponding validity
questions assisted in testing the first hypothesis: whether conservatives
would identify the ideologically confirming false meme as more accurate
when compared with the ideologically opposing meme that contained true
information; it also helped show whether knowledge levels for
conservatives differed between the memes.

17
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Figure 1 Meme showing unemployment rates under Barack Obama
and Ronald Reagan.

Figure 2 Meme criticizing Republican economic policies while stating
that most of America’s poorest counties are in red states.

The final page for the conservatives contained a false liberal meme,
which was a pie chart that showed the federal budget (Figure 3). The pie
chart is false because the military expenditure as a proportion of the
federal budget is much larger than it actually is. The meme also contains
negative language toward Republicans and criticizes the party for
18
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promoting cuts to welfare programs.

The conservative group then

answered another accuracy question, helping to further address the
second dependent variable and testing the second hypothesis: which was
whether the two groups would more easily identify the false ideologically
opposing information, in comparison to the ideologically confirming false
information. The liberal respondents went through the same process as
the conservatives, just with ideologically opposite memes.

They first

received the ideologically confirming false meme, the aforementioned
federal budget pie chart (Figure 3), and then answered a follow-up
accuracy question and a traditional knowledge question that pertained to
the information in the meme, the federal budget. On the same page, the
liberals viewed the ideologically opposing true meme and answered
another accuracy question and a traditional knowledge question that
pertained to the information in the meme (Figure 4). The final page for the
liberal respondents was constructed in the same manner as it was for the
conservatives, showing an ideologically opposing false meme (Figure 1) and
containing a follow-up accuracy and tolerance question. With both groups
combined, both hypotheses were able to be tested, and all dependent
variables examined.
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Figure 3 Meme containing a pie chart of the federal budget that
criticizes the republican party.

Figure 4 Meme with information on various murder weapons in 2011.
Survey Overview

To compensate for time constraints, the survey link was posted on
some of the researcher’s personal social media accounts in order to gather
20
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the most respondents in the shortest timeframe. This represented one
potential weakness of the study, as demographic questions showed that
respondents were not representative of any larger population in race,
religion, sex, or age.
generalizable.

As such, the results of the study were not

A total of 129 respondents took part in the survey, 7

identified as extremely liberal, 37 as liberal, 14 as slightly liberal, 36 as
moderate, 13 as slightly conservative, 21 as conservative, and 1 as
extremely conservative. Of the moderate group, 21 went on to identify as
liberal and 15 as conservative.

Of the 129 who began the survey,

approximately 112 completed the survey in its entirety; of the 112,
approximately 44 were conservative, and 69 were liberal.

Survey

responses were collected from April 18, 2016, through April 26, 2016.
Another potential weakness in posting the survey link to the researcher’s
personal social media accounts is the possibility, albeit unlikely, that
respondents may have answered differently because they were aware of
who made the survey. The survey questions were worded in such a way as
to provide a valid translation of the variables. Further, questions were
designed in such a way as to make them as clear and unbiased as possible
for the respondents.

However, the possibility remains that some

respondents may have been confused or seen bias in the way the questions
were worded. Because the survey was online, there was no potential for
bias from survey administration. Survey respondents volunteered to take
the survey, which represents an inherent weakness in itself. Finally, the
memes were chosen on the basis of having wide appeal to one ideological
group or the other, and because they contained either true or false
information. However, there exists the possibility that some respondents
may have disagreed with or held negative views toward the meme that
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confirmed their ideology. Conversely, there exists the possibility that some
respondents may have agreed with or held positive views toward the
ideologically opposing memes. While dealing with many constraints, every
possible effort was made to account for potential bias and weaknesses;
however, the researcher acknowledges that other weaknesses or bias may
exist.
To summarize, both the liberal and conservative respondents
received an ideologically confirming false meme, an ideologically opposing
true meme, and an ideologically opposing false meme. The data that was
gathered from the survey allowed the researcher to examine possible
differences in how the respondents reacted to the different memes, by way
of the dependent variables; the accuracy, knowledge, and tolerance
questions. No control group was necessary because the study was not
seeking to examine differences between those who view memes and those
who do not, instead, this study sought to evaluate whether the two
political ideologies bought into false information found on social media,
whether they rejected true information that opposed their views, and
whether there were differences between the two groups.
Analysis: Political Ideology Plays an Important Role in Determining
Accuracy
To test the first hypothesis, that conservatives and liberals would
rate ideologically confirming memes containing false information as more
accurate than ideologically opposing memes containing true information; a
survey experiment was used to collect relevant data for both groups. In
order to test the first hypothesis, the two ideological groups were coded
numerically in order to conduct quantitative analyses, with 0=liberals and
1=conservatives. The responses from the first two accuracy questions, one
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after an ideologically confirming false meme and one after an ideologically
opposing true meme, were also coded numerically and arranged on an
ordinal scale in order to be used in statistical analyses, where: definitely
accurate=4, probably accurate=3, probably inaccurate=2, definitely
inaccurate=1.

To determine whether each group rated its own false

information as more accurate, a one-way ANOVA test was used, one for
the liberal group, the results of which can be viewed in Table 1; and one for
the conservative group, the results of which can be seen in Table 2.
Table 1
ANOVA
Liberal Accuracy
Sum of

df

Squares
Between

Mean

F

Sig.

6.396

.013*

Square

2.616

1

2.616

55.623

136

.409

58.239

137

Groups
Within
Groups
Total

*p < .05. **p < .01.
For the liberal group (n=69), the information in the false confirming
meme was rated as more accurate (M= 2.68) than the information in the
ideologically opposing true meme (M= 2.41). The first hypothesis was
accepted for the liberals, as the group was significantly more likely to rate
the ideologically confirming false meme as accurate than the ideologically
opposing meme containing true information.
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Table 2
ANOVA
Conservative Accuracy
Sum of

df

Squares
Between

Mean

F

Sig.

8.484

.005*

Square

3.284

1

3.284

33.432

86

.389

36.716

87

Groups
Within
Groups
Total

*p < .05. **p < .01.
For the conservative group (N=44), the ideologically confirming false
meme was rated as more accurate (M= 2.50) than the ideologically
opposing true meme (M= 2.11). The hypothesis was also accepted for the
conservatives, as the group was significantly more likely to rate the
ideologically confirming false information as accurate than the ideologically
opposing meme containing true information. One-way ANOVA tests were
then used to test the second hypothesis, that both ideological groups
would rate the opposing false information as more inaccurate than the
confirming false information; the conservative results can be seen in Table
3; liberal results can be seen in Table 4. Only respondents who answered
both the accuracy question following the confirming false meme and the
accuracy question following the opposing false meme were included in the
analyses. The liberal group (n=66) rated the opposing false meme as more
inaccurate (M=2.03) than the confirming false meme (M=2.68) while the
conservative group too (n=43) rated the opposing false meme as more
inaccurate (M= 2.12) than the confirming false meme (M= 2.49).
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Table 3
ANOVA
Conservative Accuracy 2
Sum of

df

Squares
Between

Mean

F

Sig.

6.385

.013*

F

Sig

44.031

.000**

Square

2.977

1

2.977

39.163

84

.466

42.140

85

Groups
Within
Groups
Total

*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 4
ANOVA
Liberal Accuracy 2

Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Tota

Sum of
Squares
14.667

df
1

Mean
Square
14.667

43.303

130

.333

57.9

1

l
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
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Table 5
Chi-Square Tests
Conservative Knowledge
Value

Df

Asymptotic

Exact

Exact

Significance

Sig.

Sig. (1-

(2-sided)

(2-

sided)

sided)
Pearson

5.729a

1

.017*

4.641

1

.031*

5.865

1

.015*

Chi-Square
Continuity
Correctionb
Likelihood
Ratio
Fisher’s

.030

.015

Exact Test
Linear-by-

5.664

1

.017*

Linear
Association
N of Valid

88

Cases
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 12.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 6
Chi-Square Tests
Liberal Knowledge
Value

Pearson Chi- 9.763a

Df

Asymptotic

Exact

Exact

Significance

Sig. (2-

Sig. (1-

(2-sided)

sided)

sided)

.003

.002

1

.002**

8.648

1

.003**

9.967

1

.002**

Square
Continuity
Correctionb
Likelihood
Ratio
Fisher’s
Exact Test
Linear-by-

9.692

1

.002**

Linear
Association
N of Valid

138

Cases
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 21.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
*p < .05. **p < .01.
Thus, the second hypothesis was accepted for both the liberals and
the conservatives. Additional one-way ANOVA tests were used to observe
whether there were any significant differences between the two
ideological groups for the reinforcing meme and the opposing meme;
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however, no significant differences were found. While no hypothesis was
made regarding knowledge, Chi-Square tests were used to examine any
relevant observations; for conservative knowledge results see Table 5
above; for liberal knowledge results see Table 6.
Answer choices were coded dichotomously so they could be used
in quantitative analyses, where: 1=correct and 0=incorrect. Surprisingly,
for the conservative group (n=44) a significant positive association was
found between the ideologically opposing meme containing true
information and level of knowledge. Equally surprising, the liberal group
(n=69) too saw a significant positive association between the ideologically
opposing true meme and level of knowledge. Thus, despite both groups
rating the ideologically opposing true memes as significantly less accurate
than the ideologically confirming false memes, both groups demonstrated
significantly increased knowledge levels for the knowledge question that
corresponded with the information in the opposing true meme.
One-way ANOVA analyses were used to look for any significant
differences between the ideological groups for both the confirming meme
knowledge question and the opposing meme knowledge question; no
significant differences were observed. For the final dependent variable,
the answer choices for the tolerance question were coded numerically and
arranged on an ordinal scale in order to be used in statistical analysis. A
one-way ANOVA was used to look for differences between the ideological
groups and to assess the level of tolerance. No significant difference
between the conservative (n=43) tolerance rating (M= 4.42) and the liberal
(n=68) tolerance rating (M= 4.40) was observed.
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Discussion and Possible Implications
As the data analysis showed, ideology played a significant role in
determining the accuracy rating of the memes. Conservatives and liberals
believed that the incorrect information that catered to their views was
more accurate than the correct information opposing their views. This may
represent an extension of the research conducted by Nyhan & Reifler
(2010) as respondents were significantly more skeptical of the memes
containing ideologically opposing information. If the majority of social
media users’ interactions are with other ideologically similar users, there is
a high chance that they could regularly be exposed to incorrect and
ideologically reinforcing stimuli.

Thus, social media could facilitate a

decrease in political knowledge.
The results are not generalizable, and all implications should be
thought of as mere possibility; no claims made regarding this study should
be assumed to be applicable to any larger population. Additionally, while
memes are found across many social networking sites, social media itself
was not the platform used to conduct the experiment. Despite this, the
results certainly were compelling.

Perhaps most interesting was that

despite rating the ideologically opposing memes as less accurate, both
groups answered the corresponding knowledge questions correctly at
significantly higher rates than with the knowledge questions corresponding
with the ideologically confirming memes that both groups deemed more
accurate. It may be that respondents simply knew more about the topics
or that they guessed or used an online search engine to answer the
question. Alternatively, respondents may have been more influenced by
their ideology when viewing the confirming meme, which could then be
expressed by choosing the answer that fit their ideological beliefs. Perhaps
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when facing ideologically opposing information on which they have no firm
beliefs, the groups were more willing to go with the answer choice that the
meme information pointed to. Thus, misinformation that confirms an
individual’s biases could potentially cause them to more firmly believe the
inaccurate information, and while an individual may view ideologically
opposing information as more incorrect, an individual holding no strong
views in support of the information may be more willing to accept it as
accurate.
To expound on this point, a hypothetical conservative ideologue is
likely to be disapproving of Barack Obama’s economic policies; when
shown a meme which confirms this belief, the ideologue is essentially
expressing their opinion or strongly held belief by choosing to rate the
meme as accurate. The hypothetical conservative ideologue then answers
the knowledge question with the same strongly held belief in mind, that
Obama has not improved economic conditions for Black Americans, and
subsequently answers the question incorrectly. The same hypothetical
conservative ideologue may believe that most poverty in America occurs in
cities; however, they likely hold no strong feelings on the subject. When
shown a meme which claims that the vast majority of the poorest U.S.
counties are located in ‘Red States’, the hypothetical conservative believes
the information is inaccurate but because they hold no strong feelings on
the subject; they opt to answer the knowledge question based on the
information in the meme, despite that information standing oppositional to
their views. While a hypothetical conservative was used in the previous
examples, liberals scored significantly higher on the knowledge question
that followed the ideologically opposing meme and thus are equally as
likely as the conservatives to have answered both the accuracy and
30
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knowledge questions in a similar manner, biased by their beliefs.
Additionally, this explanation for why both groups scored significantly
higher on the knowledge questions that followed the ideologically opposite
memes, despite rating the memes as more inaccurate, could be incorrect.
It is also possible that some memes may have provoked an emotional
response in some respondents, perhaps influencing their answers. This is
an area that deserves more research because if social media users are
indeed rarely being exposed to ideologically opposite information, this
could have a negative impact on political knowledge; however, if the echo
chamber is false, then perhaps social media could facilitate more
individuals to question their beliefs.
The tolerance results showed that roughly 50% of both groups
expressed neither affection nor dislike for the opposite ideology. The
tolerance results were relatively unsurprising given that only 7% of
respondents claimed to be an extreme ideologue; roughly 50% of
respondents described themselves as either adhering to neither ideology
or as slight ideologues.

Further, it should be noted that the survey

question is not necessarily an accurate measure of tolerance. Future
research should attempt to examine opposing, blatantly incorrect
information of a political nature on social media, and its impact on
politically invested ideologues with strong opinions.
Despite the lack of external validity, the study accomplished its
original goals and shed light on an area that deserves more research. In
any case, misinformation via memes certainly had a significant impact on
survey respondents.

The Internet, and social networking sites, in

particular, offer a new medium through which people can consume
information, express opinions, and communicate with others. Some view
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cyberspace as a benevolent entity where individuals can interact with
those holding opposing views and be exposed to new ideas and
information, essentially increasing knowledge and tolerance. An increase
in tolerance certainly seems suspect given that increased tolerance is
intricately tied to an increase in specific types of knowledge. Others argue
that the new medium will only increase polarization amongst the political
elite and lead to decreased levels of tolerance; and that moderates will
only consume the entertainment side of the web, brushing aside news and
politics. Regardless, it seems unlikely that online social media and the
propagation of misinformation throughout the web would produce no
meaningful impact.

Whether social media increases knowledge and

tolerance through cross-ideological interaction, decreases the two by way
of the echo chamber; has no impact; or an entirely different impact
altogether; remains to be seen.
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The Influence of Public Opinion in the Decisions of State Supreme Court
Judges
Grace Wald, Virginia Commonwealth University

Scholars have continuously observed and debated the reasons
behind the decisions of both federal and state judges in the United States.
While there are well-established models for judicial decision-making at the
federal level, these models are not consistently applicable to judicial
decisions at a state level. Traditionally, there are two key theories applied
by researchers to explain the different decisions made in the federal
judicial systems in the United States and abroad. These theories of judicial
decision-making are the legal and attitudinal models (Spaeth, 2002). The
legal model is the traditional model of judicial decision-making and
suggests that judges do not act on their personal policy preferences when
interpreting and applying the law. The attitudinal model says that judges
will make decisions based on their personal preferences and political
ideologies gained from their personal experiences. Although the attitudinal
model is widely accepted among political scientists to explain decisions in
the United States Supreme Court, Spaeth admits that perhaps neither of
these models accurately applies to the lower courts (2002). This may be
because most judges in lower level and state courts remain in office at the
will of other political actors, and therefore are less independent in their
decisions (Savchak 2007, Canes-Wrone 2012, Shepherd 2009).
Because these two traditional judicial decision-making models lack
validity when one attempts to explain the decisions of judges in state
courts, many studies have sought other explanations for the decisions of
state judges, particularly in state courts of last resort (Savchak 2007, Canes-
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Wrone 2012,Brace et al 2008). The study of state courts of last resort is
important for several reasons. State courts of last resort resolve most of
the legal disputes in the country, have the final say on issues that are
fundamental to citizens’ daily lives, exercise increasing levels of discretion
over matters of public policy, and, for political scientists, offer
opportunities to test hypotheses about judicial processes and behavior
(Brace 2000). These opportunities exist due to the many different rules,
selection systems, and demographics that are in each state’s court of last
resort. These differences make state courts of last resort ripe for
comparison. This paper will compare states’ different selection systems
and conclude if the type of judicial selection method affects how judges
make their decisions in cases.
The decisions of judges are not always easy or popular, which is
why an independent judiciary is so crucial to the legal system.
Unfortunately, when judges depend on public opinion for election and
reelection, an unpopular decision has the potential to threaten their
position on the bench. In 2014 in order to retain their positions, Tennessee
Supreme Court Justices Gary Wade, Connie Clark and Sharon Lee were
forced to defend their decisions in criminal cases because of a campaign
against them ran by the Lieutenant Governor of the state, Ron Ramsey,
who claimed the judges were too liberal in their decision-making regarding
death penalty cases (Srikrishnan, 2014). During this campaign hundreds of
thousands of dollars from PACs and interest groups were spent on
campaign advertisements to convince the public that these justices were
too soft on crime and therefore needed to be replaced (Srikrishnan, 2014).
In turn the justices created a group called Keep Tennessee Courts Fair in
order to raise money to fight these accusations and sway public opinion.
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Ultimately, the justices won retention and were allowed to remain on the
bench. But if they want to avoid another vicious campaign, these justices
may have to consider public opinion more in their future decision-making.
In 2010 three state Supreme Courts justices were not as lucky and lost
their election due to a controversial decision that upheld the right of samesex couples to marry (Srikrishnan, 2014). These elections and their
campaigns, implemented to hold judges more accountable to the public,
may make decisions of judges dependent on public opinion. The possibility
of a judicial selection method, which enables public opinion to affect the
decisions of judges, is problematic because it threatens judicial
independence.
The theory that the type of judicial selection method applied will
affect a judge’s behavior is not new. States and scholars have yet to come
to a consensus on how our judges should be appointed to state courts
(Geyh, 2008). The United States is unique in that each individual state uses
a different system to appoint state judges to the bench, each system comes
with advantages and disadvantages. These judicial selection methods
attempt to balance judicial independence (the idea that decisions of judges
should not be influenced by outside actors) with democratic accountability
(the idea that citizens should be able to hold judges responsible for their
behavior). These selection systems are: gubernatorial and legislative
appointment, partisan and nonpartisan election, and merit selection.
Gubernatorial and legislative appointments were the first types of judicial
selection to arise in the colonial courts but were criticized for the lack of
accountability of the judges (Geyh, 2008). In Gubernatorial appointments,
the governor of the state makes the initial appointment of the judges,
while in legislative appointments, the state legislators choose the judges.
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Both selection systems have become less popular throughout the years.
California, Maine and New Jersey use gubernatorial appointment, and
South Carolina and Virginia are the only states that use the legislative
appointment method.
Partisan elections as a selection method were instituted because it
was argued that elected judges would be more accountable to the people
and more independent thinking than those selected by governors and
legislatures (Geyh, 2008). But these judicial partisan elections were found
to have some weaknesses,as some scholars have argued that partisan
elections cause unqualified judges with clear policy preferences, supported
by party leaders, to be elected to the bench (Geyh, 2008). This is
problematic because the judges can lose their judicial independence from
the political parties. Hence non-partisan elections, in which candidates run
with no party affiliation, were instituted in several states to diminish party
influence, although Geyh argues that this has led to even less informed
voters. These non-partisan elections are also contested races and often
force judicial candidates to act politically in order to gain support.
The merit selection of judges was the next method to be instituted.
In the merit selection, the judges are appointed by the governor from a list
of potential candidates created by nonpartisan nominating committees.
After two or three years, depending on the state, the selected judges face
periodic unopposed retention elections. In these elections the judges are
not affiliated with any party and therefore the public has to evaluate their
performance on the bench.
However, merit selections may be losing some merit. Although
retention elections of judges used to be modest events, recently, as
demonstrated in the aforementioned Tennessee case, they have become
38
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increasingly politicized. Several authors attribute this politicization to the
rise of the new style judicial campaigns that involve interest groups who
campaign against the reelection of judges based on their decisions in often
salient cases and judicial candidates announcing their policy preferences
(Canes-Wrone 2010, Geyh, 2008, Gibson, 2008, Cann 2008). These new
style campaigns have been found by researchers to have the ability to
threaten judicial independence. Although the American Bar Association
used to recommend that states use the merit system to select their judges,
the recommendation was discontinued in 2003 (Geyh, 2008), because
retention elections are becoming more similar to the contested partisan
and nonpartisan elections. In these three types of elections, which are
often unopposed, judges run campaigns that are funded by interest groups
and advertise their “good” decisions, like the conviction of a murderer, and
promise to make certain future decisions (Last Week Tonight with Jon
Oliver Report). In turn, political parties, politicians, or private bodies that
dislike the decisions of the judges can choose to run campaigns against the
judges’ retention or reelection.
The election of judges is cause for concern because it weakens
judicial independence. State judges are trusted to make impartial decisions
on a wide array of cases. Yet several studies have found that judges change
their behavior in a way more closely matched with their constituency when
faced with elections (Savchak 2007, Canes-Wrone 2012, Shepherd 2009). If
elections force or encourage judges to change their decision in cases, they
become more like politicians than judges. Judicial elections have the
potential to influence state judges to rule in favor of the popular party or
the party that contributed the most to their campaign, rather than
impartially ruling in favor of the deserving party according to the law.
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Current justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have even recently expressed
their disdain for state judicial elections. Justices Kennedy and Breyer
concurred that, “When one considered that elections require candidates to
conduct campaigns and to raise funds…the persisting question is whether
that process is consistent with the perception and reality of judicial
independence and judicial excellence” (qtd Shepherd 2009). Because most
states hold elections for their judges, it is important to know if they are
flawed or weaken judicial independence. Is the behavior of judges
influenced by their selection method? Are elected judges more influenced
by public opinion than judges appointed by state governors and legislators?
Are judges elected in partisan and non-partisan elections more responsive
to public opinion than judges who face retention elections?
Literature Review
Many authors have studied how partisan, nonpartisan, and
retention elections encourage the judges to be more strategic in their
decision-making. Hall (1992) tested if minority justices in state supreme
courts acted strategically when ruling cases close to reelection. In the four
southern states that were observed, Hall found that judges in the minority
will rule with the majority towards the end of the term, which suggests that
elections influence judicial behavior. Canes-Wrone et al. (2010) studied
possible changes in the decisions of state judges due to the retention
election process, more specifically if judges who are up for retention
elections are more responsive to public opinion on abortions. Looking at
the decisions on abortion made in the highest state appellate courts in
states that hold retention elections, they used mixed model to analyze the
data on state Supreme Court votes. Canes-Wrone et al. (2010) found that
as public opinion became more pro-choice, state judges issued more pro40
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choice decisions. In a different study that was also authored by CanesWrone and looked at abortion cases, the authors (2009) found that on
salient issues nonpartisan elections encourage popular judicial decisions,
especially given the rise of these new style campaigns previously
mentioned.
Similarly, but with a different approach, Brace el al.(2008)used the
Brace-Hall State Supreme Court Data Archive to study the direct and
indirect effects of upcoming retention elections on judicial decisions in
death penalty cases. Brace found that in states where judges in the state
supreme court have to be elected to retain their positions and there is a
strong public support for the death penalty, the courts tend to be more
conservative in their decisions. Shepherd (2009) looked at a different type
salient case and found that judges who are facing reappointment favor the
government more often in their decisions, although the actual cause for
this pattern was not established. However, Shepherd’s data set of all the
state supreme court decisions from 1995 to 1998 showed that, “judges
strategic voting increases as retention approaches but is almost
nonexistent among judges with life tenure or those facing mandatory
retirement” (1625) suggesting that approaching retention can influence
decisions. Another approach taken by Lewis et al. (2014) was to study if the
combination of direct democracies and retention elections increase the
influence of public opinion on judicial decisions. Like Canes- Wrone, Brace,
and Shephard, Lewis et al focused on a publicly salient issue and used a
data set that had state judicial decisions on this issue from 1981 to 2004.
They found that elected judges in direct democracy states have the
potential to overturn a policy directly enacted by the public and therefore
the judges are more responsive to public opinion (2014).
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The previous four studies analyzed state judicial decisions in a
single type of civil or criminal case, while other authors have studied the
decisions in multiple types of criminal cases. Savchak et al. (2007) also
tested the effect of citizen ideology in state Supreme Court judicial
decisions as judges approach retention elections. Unlike Brace et al and
Canes –Wrone et al, who only evaluated one type of case, Savchak et al.
studied all criminal cases and used the logit model to specify the random
effects related to each case. Their results showed that, “In states where
citizen preferences are conservative, judges’ decisions become more progovernment as retention elections draw closer” (408), more generally
supporting the theory that elections have influence on state judicial
decisions (2007). Huber and Sanford (2004) studied trial court judges and
their decisions in criminal cases in proximity to elections, instead of looking
at state Supreme Court judges like Brace, Canes-Wrone, and Saychek.
Analyzing criminal cases in Pennsylvania’s Courts of Common Pleas in the
1990’s, the authors described the relationship between the independent
variable-electoral

proximity

and

the

dependent

variable-assigned

sentences. Huber and Sanford (2004) concluded that trial judges give
harsher sentences if their reelection is close because the judges want to
win the favor of the public before their retention election.
Additionally, research has compared how state judicial decisions
for minorities alter from each judicial selection system. Hernandez-Julian
(2014) studied how the racial populations of a defendant’s community is
related to the sentence of that defendant in states that use different
judicial selection methods, and found that in states where judges are
elected, a black defendant is better off if there is a higher black population,
while in states where judges are appointed, the black population does not
42
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make a difference in the judge’s decisions. Instead of looking at public
opinion, this research is different because it looks at the minority
population influence on judicial decisions involving minorities.
The majority of this past research suggests that state judges are
constrained while making their decisions and that judicial elections
influence judges to make popular decisions especially in salient cases.
Although the research on this topic has been extensive, there are still areas
in this topic that need to be researched and explored.

Judges’

responsiveness to the public on multiple salient issues has yet to be fully
explored. A lot of studies only analyze one type of judicial selection (CanesWrone 2010, Brace-Hall 2008, Savchak 2009), while others do not
distinguish between the different types of judicial elections. There is also
little research comparing judges’ responsiveness to the public on multiple
different criminal cases in states that use different judicial election
methods. This paper will attempt to explore these absent areas of
research; it will look at all types of criminal issues and some legal issues and
compare the five different selection methods impact on judicial decisions.
Hypotheses
Because some judges have to face some type of election in order to
get on or stay on the bench, they are accountable to and constrained by
the public. Therefore in order to attain and remain in their positions, judges
have to appeal to the public. In other words, in states where judicial
partisan elections are held, non-partisan, and retention elections are held,
the decisions of judges are more responsive to public than in states where
judges are appointment because those elected judges do not want to risk
losing their position.
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Therefore I hypothesize that
H1: In states with judicial partisan elections, if the ideology of the
state’s citizens is liberal, then the judges in that state will more likely make
a liberal decision.
H2: In states with judicial nonpartisan elections, if the ideology of the
state’s citizens is liberal, then the judges in that state will more likely make
a liberal decision.
H3: In states with merit judicial selection, if the ideology of the state’s
citizens is liberal, then the judges in that state will more likely make a
liberal decision
H4: In states where judges are appointed by a governor or the state
legislature, public opinion will have little to no effect on judicial decisions.
Variables
The independent variables in this study are the selection method of
state: partisan and non-partisan election, merit system, and gubernatorial
and legislative appointment, and the public opinion of the state. The public
opinion of the state is measured using the McIver, Erikson, and Wright
(2001) scores that were developed using data from CBS/ New York Times
public opinion surveys from 1997-99, the time frame of the data set. The
measure range from -2 (most conservative) to 2(most liberal). These scores
are the most appropriate to use because of their validity in past studies
(e.g. Savchak 2007; Brace 2008). The dependent variable is the ideological
leanings of an individual judge’s vote in criminal cases. In previous studies
that only looked at judges’ decisions in one type of salient case, their votes
or decisions could easily be dubbed as liberal or conservative, like a vote to
uphold the death penalty sentence in a death penalty case is conservative.
In this study, all criminal cases are studied, which means a conservative
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vote has to be conceptualized a little differently. Because the cases in this
data set took place in state supreme courts, they are appeal cases. In
appeal cases judges decide based on procedural issues of the case rather
than specific facts of the case. Despite this, as the campaign efforts in
Tennessee State Supreme Court in 2014 demonstrated, decisions that rule
in favor of the criminal are often dubbed to the public to be liberal, the
decisions that favor the government are deemed conservative, even if the
justices are ruling on procedural issues. Past research agrees with the
conceptualization of decisions in criminal appeals in favor of the
respondent as liberal and decisions in favor for the state or the petitioner
as conservative (Brace and Hall 1995, Savchak 2007). In state supreme
courts, like the United States Supreme Court, the justices often sit with up
to nine other justices to rule over a case, which means one case could up to
nine votes. A judge’s vote will be coded 1 if it is liberal and 0 if it is
conservative.
In order to ensure that the results are not caused by some
influence other than the selection method, a number of variables have to
be controlled. One of the control variables is the ideological preferences of
each judge, measured by party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure,
or PAJID, developed by Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000) . PAJID is the most
common, valid, and reliable measure of judges’ ideology, which combines
the judge’s partisan affiliation with the ideologies of their states at the time
of appointment. The measure was used in many of research in the
literature review (e.g. Savchak 2007; Brace 2008;Shepherd, 2009). The
judges’ ideology need to be controlled to ensure that judicial elections are
the actual influence of judges’ behavior and that judges are not simply
ruling with their ideology. PAJID scale is from 1 to 100, with 1 as the most
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conservative and 100 as the most liberal. Whether the Supreme Court sits
en banc is also included as a control because it can influence the type of
cases the courts hears. In states where courts do sit en banc, litigants are
placed in front of all the judges and can anticipate the ideology of those
judges, but in those states where judges do not sit en banc, litigants will
not know which judge will decide their case and therefore can not predict
their ideology, which will discourage an appeal (Shepherd 2009). The
states that sit en banc will be coded as 1 and the states that do not will be
coded as 0.
Data and Method
To test this hypothesis, the study will use data from the State
Supreme Court Data Project archive (SSCDA). Until 1996, when this data set
was in process, there was not a reliable and organized fifty state data set
on state courts that combine case judge and contextual variables (BraceHall 2000). More specifically this database has 21,296 cases in courts of last
resorts in all 50 states in the period 1995-97 and each case had 423
variables. The variables include case type (criminal, civil private, civil
public, etc.), case issues justice voting, judge characteristics like age and
political ideology score, measured by PAJID, and state characteristics like
the judicial selection method and the states’ citizens’ ideological score,
measured by EWI. Most of the studies (Savchak 2007, Brace 2008,
Shepherd 2009) used this data set, which includes decisions made in the
late 1990s.
The cases used in this study will come from the nine states that
hold partisan elections, thirteen that hold nonpartisan elections, fourteen
states that hold retention elections, and three states that hold
gubernatorial or legislative appointments. Several states were excluded
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from this study because of their unique judicial selection methods. For
example Delaware and New York were excluded from the study because
their judges are reappointed by the governor and confirmed by the state
senate. Hawaii was excluded because in their system a nominating
commission retains the judges every ten years. Massachusetts and Rhode
Island were excluded because judges there have life tenure. Vermont was
excluded because they retain their position through a vote in the Senate.
Maine, Nebraska and New Jersey were also excluded.
The study will examine all criminal cases because it has been found
that only a small number of cases in the SSCDA are salient issues to the
public. The majority of studies on this topic also tend to only analyze one
type of case issue like the death penalty (Brace 2008) and abortion (CanesWrone 2010), which is problematic because those results are inapplicable
to other types of case issues. If my hypotheses are correct, it will suggest
that judicial elections compel the judges in state supreme courts to make
popular decisions in all areas of criminal law.
To test the hypotheses, this study used a binary logistic regression
model because the dependent variable, judge vote, is dichotomous, and I
want to know whether it has a relationship with the independent variable,
public opinion, and whether the independent variable is causing a change
in the dependent variable.
Results
To achieve the results on the charts below, all the criminal cases
were selected out of the SSCDA data set and placed into a different sheet.
Then the cases in the new sheet were split up by their judicial selection
method and analyzed. The table below shows the results of the binary
logistic regression model of decisions made by state Supreme Court judges
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in partisan, nonpartisan, merit, and appointment systems between 1995
and 1997. The results show strong support for H1, H2, H3, and H4.
First, all of the coefficients for public opinion (EWI) are statistically
significant. As public opinion in states with partisan, non-partisan, and
merit election systems become more liberal, judges in those state supreme
courts are slightly more likely to make a liberal decision. In other words the
ideological preferences of the citizens in states that hold judicial elections
has an effect on the vote of the state supreme court judge in a criminal
case.
Meanwhile in states with judicial appointments, the preferences of
the citizens have a negative relationship with the judges’ votes. This may be
because in those states either the legislative branch or the governor, or
both in conjunction, appoints and reappoints the judge and hence the
ideological preferences of the legislative branch or the governor are more
influential in the judges’ decision-making than public opinion.
The ideology of the judge (PAJID) held no effect on the votes of
judges in states with partisan and appointment systems, but had a really
slight effect on the votes of judges in states with merit and non-partisan
systems. This may be because in states with non-partisan elections and
unopposed retention elections, the state Supreme Court judges have more
room to act on their own preferences because they do not represent a
political party.
In merit selection systems, there is a stronger relationship between
the vote of the judge and sitting en banc than the vote of the judge and the
citizens’ preferences. Perhaps justices can be influenced or convinced by
the other justices they sit with during cases.

48

____________________The Influence of Public Opinion in the Decisions of State Supreme Court Judges

Although the hypotheses were confirmed, these results should be
looked upon with caution. Some of the variables that have the potential to
affect the vote of judge like term limits and years on the bench were
excluded from this study due to time for extensive research and further
data collection. Another variable I would have liked to include is the
proximity to elections during the decision. There is also possible human
error in these results. Over 30,000 votes, 14,446 from states with partisan
elections, 12, 992, from states with non partisan elections, and 2,186 from
states with judicial legislative and gubernatorial appointments, were used
to get the calculations below, which makes it really easy to miss an error.
The amounts of votes from states with non-partisan elections and
legislative and gubernatorial elections are smaller because fewer states
used those systems at the time of the data collection.
Partisan Elections

Non-Partisan Elections
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Merit

Appointment

Conclusion
Despite the lack of control variables, this study suggests that judges
who face elections in state Supreme Courts rule more closely to public
opinion. The focus of this study was the effect of different judicial selection
methods and public opinion on judicial behavior. After analyzing all criminal
cases in from 1995-1997 in states that have partisan, non partisan, merit or
retention, and appointment systems, it was determined that in states that
hold judicial elections, if the public opinion is liberal, then the vote of the
judge is more likely to be liberal. In the United States, 9/10 of state court
judges are accountable to the public through some type of election
(Shepherd 2009). Although the results are small and should be taken with
caution, any variable that influences the decisions of judges even a little
has the potential to weaken the legitimacy of the judicial system. In order
for justice to occur the law should be applied equally and impartially no
matter the ideological makeup of the public. Unfortunately according to
the results of this study, the results of the studies in the literature review,
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and the recent campaigns in Tennessee and Iowa, this is not the case
throughout the country. Judges at all levels of state courts have to act like
politicians and appeal to the public in order to get on the bench and to stay
on the bench. If future studies on more current cases yield similar results,
reform to the judiciary in order to maintain judicial independence might be
necessary. Or perhaps “an independent judiciary” will cease to exist. For
now this study contributes to the century long debate over best and proper
judicial selection system in states courts.
For future research, the influence of interests groups, PACs,
politicians, and lawyers over the decisions of judges in certain cases should
be determined. Interest groups and PACs are some the reasons judicial
elections evolved from low-key affairs to high key political events. (Brace
2008, Canes –Wrone 2010, Srikrishnan, 2014). Some judges are on the
bench due to the contributions of PACs, interest groups, politicians and
lawyers. It would be interesting to study if the judges rule in favor of these
contributors. Moreover PACs, interests groups, some lawyers and
politicians are probably more likely to support corrupt candidates to ensure
their future favor rather than the candidates with the most merit. Another
suggestion for future research would be a comparison of the effect of
public opinion on judicial votes and the effect of interest group
contributions on judges’ votes to see which has a higher effect.
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What’s Ours Isn’t Yours: Measuring the Successes of the Radical Right
Across Strong and Weak Welfare States
Lindsay April, Virginia Commonwealth University

On December 6th, 2015, National Front, France’s most prominent
far-right party, received 28% of the total votes in the first round of France’s
regional elections. This recent showing of the National Front is neither
unprecedented nor surprising. Under the leadership of the highly
conservative and nationalistic Marine Le Pen, the party amassed 25% of the
French seats in European Parliament in 2014. Though it’s tempting to
attribute the success of nativist parties, such as National Front, to concerns
across Europe over refugees, these fears do not account for the full scope
of radical right success in the region. A more nuanced understanding of the
success of National Front and parties similar to it across Europe can be
ascertained by examining the qualities specific to the state in which they
are based. In the case of France, the European state that designates the
highest percentage of its GDP to social welfare programs, the success of
the National Front is not a phenomena clearly extricable from the nation’s
large welfare state. Europe has seen an explosion in the amount of
immigrants received over the past fifty years; in this time, the percent
immigrant population in Western Europe has tripled, producing a political
climate eager to lend its fecundity to radical right, anti-immigrant parties
(Stockemer 2016).
There has been considerable scholarly attention paid to the rise of
radical right parties as they’ve steadily gained traction across Europe. The
impressive showing by the National Front and other far-right parties in
states such as Denmark and Austria in the European Parliamentary
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elections suggests that the attention paid to these parties is warranted, as
members of the radical right find themselves in positions conducive to
affecting policy, both nationally and across the European Union. Thus far,
much attention has been paid to a few significant variables in explaining
the rise of the Radical Right, such as the ethnic heterogeneity that
accompanies increased rates of immigration (Achterberg, Koster and van
der Waal 2012). The existence of immigration and a general disdain for the
“other” is central to most Radical-Right platforms. One common platform
item utilized by these parties to mobilize voters is rooted in welfare
chauvinist attitudes (Achterberg, Koster and van der Waal 2012). Party
members espousing these attitudes stress that the welfare systems in a
given state are designated solely for the people native to that state,
warning that the reliance on the system by non-natives detracts from the
system’s ability to provide for its native population (Achterberg, Koster and
van der Waal 2012). Though various scholars disagree on the effectiveness
of the welfare chauvinism approach to forming solid constituencies, none
have taken into account how the size of a state’s social spending affects the
radical right’s ability to do so.
Therefore, this research seeks to empirically evaluate the
credibility of the welfare chauvinist approach as it might be reflected in the
successes (and failures) of radical right parties in states with disparate
levels of social spending, which has thus been largely ignored in the
literature. This gap is substantial, given that it would seem that the capacity
of a state’s welfare system would have some effect on the far right’s ability
to mobilize voters using this approach (Rydgren 2008). Therefore, I argue
that this voter-mobilization approach has been unfairly cast aside by
scholars who’ve ignored the percent of a state’s GDP appropriated for
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social spending. Taking into account social spending as an independent
variable, I intend to look at secondary quantitative data to establish
whether or not there is a correlation between generous welfare programs
and the electoral successes of the radical right in that state. In doing so,
this research can answer whether or not the welfare chauvinist hypothesis
for the success of the radical right is dependent on the extent to which the
state in question is a welfare state in question.
Literature Review
There exists a surfeit of literature probing the relationship between
anti-immigration sentiment in welfare states, and the prominence of
radical right and nativist parties in these regions. In the past two decades,
the phenomenon of radical right parties gaining traction (particularly in
Europe) has enjoyed considerable attention. It’s commonly held that these
parties mobilize voters based on four basic political tenants: immigration
threatens cultural identity, takes jobs away from natives, increases crime,
and hyper-extends the welfare state (Zaslove 2004). The latter of the
four—the concern that high rates of immigration cause undue strain on the
welfare state—is most pertinent to the research I intend to conduct, which
asks whether or not states with highly generous welfare programs foster
the success of radical right parties.
Although I do not intend to measure the anti-immigrant sentiment
across nations that gives rise to these parties, I must examine the literature
surrounding these attitudes to appropriately conceptualize what the radical
right represents to voters. Because radical right parties and pundits seek to
mobilize voters based on a supposed immigrant strain on social services
and threat to the “common man”, it is worth asking whether the research
exists to substantiate the claim that immigrants target areas with expansive
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welfare programs (Nordensvard & Ketola 2015). This concept of the
“welfare magnet” has been addressed in regard to immigration in the work
of Borjas (1999), which substantiates that immigrants do often engage in
wealth-maximizing behavior by pre-selecting states to immigrate to on the
virtue of their social expenditure. Based on Borjas’ findings, it can be said
that the platforms of radical right parties are in part based on a
phenomenon that actually exists, rather than on baseless fear mongering in
their constituencies. Still, research suggests that the hard numbers of
immigrants within a given region is hardly a predictor for radical right
success; electoral gains by these parties are more contingent on the
electorate’s perception of the number of immigrants (Stockemer 2016).
Thus, Borjas' (1999) findings have little bearing on how immigrants are
received in their host countries, and are therefore a poor predictor for
radical right success. The subjective perceptions of voters are far more
likely to bolster support for nativist parties than are the statistics presented
by Borjas (Stockemer 2016; Borjas 1999).
Given that the anti-immigrant sentiment responsible for the rise of
nativist parties is not informed by rising numbers of immigrants, it needs to
be explored to what degree does the level of ethnic heterogeneity in a
nation give way to the attitudes represented by the radical right
(Stockemer 2016). Alesana and Glaeser (2004) have posited no small
amount of work answering how ethnic heterogeneity affects welfare policy
and other issues of concern to nativist parties. This question relates to my
own insofar as it is acknowledged that radical right parties gain traction
when ethnic sameness in a country is challenged (Rydgren 2008). Much of
Alesana and Glaeser’s work posits that strong welfare states with high
social spending have a pre-condition of ethnic homogeneity (2004). Their
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work is often cited as a seminal text in the discourse surrounding the
welfare state and ethnic heterogeneity, having constructed an explanation
for the relatively weak support for social spending the United States
compared to various affluent democracies in Europe (Alesana and Glaeser
2004). Prior to this text, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) came to a similar
conclusion, alleging “native” discontent when they perceived that their taxfunded social programs were primarily affording privileges to the “other”,
suggesting that a narrative of immigrant drain on welfare resources was a
very real concern to the people of the United States.
The theory of ethnic competition in the context of public
expenditure in ethnically heterogeneous climates has risen to prominence
in other works as well. Eger (2010) finds support for this theory in her
analysis of Sweden, from which she has found consistent results that large
influxes of immigration bode poorly for attitudes towards spending on the
public sector. Eger’s paper takes into account the particularly generous
nature of the Swedish welfare state, which relegates the highest
percentage of its GDP in the world on social expenditure, coupled with very
recent trends away from ethnic homogeneity (Eger 2010). In addition, the
backlash to immigration demonstrated in declining support for social
spending in Sweden illustrated in Eger’s paper lends plausibility to the idea
that high levels of social spending could make a public more inclined to
support the platforms of anti-immigrant parties.

The literature also

suggests that radical right parties in Europe have mobilized voters on the
basis of ethnic competition theory; this is notable, as it identifies a primary
channel by which radical right parties are able to seize anti-immigrant
sentiment for the purposes of garnering support (Rydgren & Ruth 2011).
The presence of negative domestic economic factors, such as
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unemployment, are also commonly evaluated as an impetus for higher
levels of anti-immigration sentiment and a decline in support for welfare
(Gorodzeisky, Raijman and Semyonov 2006; Rydgren and Ruth 2011).
A myriad of scholars have pointed to weaknesses in these works.
Contrary to Alesina and Glaeser, Girdes’ (2011) findings failed to locate a
relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and public sector spending.
Girdes’s (2011) conclusions are consistent with a separate body of
literature that subverts the correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and
weakened support for welfare to the institutional strength of welfare
states. However, Girdes merely measures the actual change in welfare
policy, rather than concerted efforts to change it by radical right and
nativist parties. Therefore, though there might be considerable
impediments to changing welfare policies, such as strong and durable
welfare institutions, the lack of change in welfare policy is not necessarily a
reflection of the efforts to change such policies. Still, other research has
found that anti-immigration attitudes have indeed shaped public policy in
meaningful ways in looking at countries outside Girdes’s scope (Zaslove
2004). The implications of these conflicting findings suggest that there are
country-level independent variables that affect a country’s vulnerability to
a far-right initiated policy shift. The amount of welfare spending in a state
is one of these unexamined variables and therefore merits further
investigation.
The role of welfare-chauvinist attitudes in affecting public
sentiment and immigration policy is also fairly well documented. Brady and
Finnigan (2014) attempt to refocus the discourse around anti-welfare
attitudes

and

immigration

by

shifting

the

focus

from

ethnic

fractionalization (Alesina and Glaeser 2004) to a compensation hypothesis
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and welfare chauvinism hypothesis. In the former, immigration heightens
the perception that jobs are low, and those who stand to benefit from
generous welfare packages are more inclined to support the welfare state;
this would suggest that heightened levels of immigration would bolster
these sentiments and increase support for radical right and nativist parties.
In the latter, individuals will support welfare policies that seems likely to
help those with whom they racially, ethnically, or culturally identify (Brady
and Finnigan 2014).
Viewing popular support for social welfare through the latter
framework, the likelihood that native citizens would be wary to endow
‘outsiders’ with welfare services decreases drastically. The welfare
chauvinism hypothesis is particularly important in this scenario, as it
suggests that radical right parties can still mobilize voters based on
perceived over-use of welfare systems by immigrants, even in the case that
support for high social spending has not diminished. The immigration
discourse is said to have been reframed entirely by these far-right parties in
some cases; more emphasis on what scholars have referred to as the
“welfare nation-state,” intimately linking the ideas of national identity and
entitlement to the spoils of welfare spending (Nordensvard and Ketola
2015). The notion of the welfare nation-state is consistent with one of the
underlying themes of this paper, namely the idea that strong welfare states
are especially likely to be framed by the radical right as a sort of welfare
nation-state, in which the in-group is deserving and the out-group is not.
Other works on welfare chauvinism have produced similar results,
with some caveats; the case has also been made that although the success
of radical right parties corresponds closely to anti-immigration platforms,
the welfare issue itself is often not the one most pressing in the minds of
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voters when deciding which party to vote for (Achterberg, Koster and van
der Waal 2012; Rydgren, 2008). Achterberg’s findings suggest that antiimmigration sentiment and radical right parties should be less politically
relevant in states with very generous welfare programs (Achterberg, Koster
and van der Waal 2012). However, in reaching this conclusion, Achterberg
only looks at one state, rendering this conclusion limited in its usefulness.
The authors do point to percent GDP for welfare spending as a variable that
has been neglected in most of the literature as a possible jumping-off point
for future research, which this paper intends to address (Achterberg,
Koster and van der Waal 2012). Rydgren (2008) also fails to take into
account welfare expenditure across states before concluding that welfare
chauvinist rhetoric is inconsequential in mobilizing voters.
Also of interest to this paper is the literature surrounding nations
that haven’t seen a surge in radical right wing parties, despite embodying
the conditions thought to be conducive to their formation (O’Malley 2006).
Though O’Malley posits a few explanations for this absence, such as
Ireland’s lack of colonial legacies in regions from which immigrants might
come from, he overlooks the relatively weak Irish welfare state as a
possible explanatory factor (2006). Another EU nation with a lack of a
strong radical right presence is Estonia (Kasekamp 2003). Although the
negligible radical right parties in Estonia espouse the same nativist and
Eurosceptic ideologies as those in fellow EU nations, these parties, like the
Irish, have failed to gain momentum (Kasekamp 2003). Kasekamp
acknowledges Estonian liberal economic policies (and aversion to social
spending and subsidies) as potential deterrent for the formation of radical
right parties, like those seen in the Nordic countries with large welfare
states (2003). Therefore, economic liberalism and aversion to socialized
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programs in Estonia seems to be the primary reason that far-right parties
(which are mostly in agreement with this national ideology) are not
successful (Kasekamp 2003). Moreover, low welfare expenditure could be
a factor in deterring radical-right success in Estonia and Ireland. As these
nations have among the lowest percent GDP welfare spending, there is
ostensibly little at stake in terms of sharing these resources with nonnatives.
In evaluating the successes of the radical right in terms of antiimmigration platforms, Zaslove (2004) goes a step further in identifying the
success rates of these parties in prompting state adaptation of antiimmigration policy. His work deals explicitly with radical right parties that
have successfully joined governing coalitions. In both of the studies
examined, it’s found that once radical right parties join governing
coalitions, they are often successful in passing policy at the expense of
immigrants (Zaslove 2004); these findings suggest that radical right parties,
long considered pariahs in the political realm, have gained considerable
traction, effecting change to welfare and immigration policies via governing
coalitions. In considering why these parties are able to prosper in some
countries and not in others, examining the welfare structures themselves,
particularly in terms of the generosity of these programs, will be
worthwhile in elucidating whether or not there is a correlation between
high public spending and the emergence of the radical right into political
prominence.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis being explored in this paper posits a positive
correlation between the amount of social spending in a state (independent
variable) and the electoral success of Radical Right Parties in European
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countries, (dependent variable). Specifically, I hypothesize that large
welfare expenditures within a state increase the likelihood that the state
will have a strong Radical Right presence. My hypothesis builds on the
welfare chauvinist approach to understanding the rise of Radical Right
parties, which suggests that natives of a state may vote for the radical right
due to fears that non-deserving members of society (i.e.; immigrants)
hyper-extend the welfare state and diminish the resources available to
natives. I extrapolate upon this and assume that citizens in strong welfare
states are more apprehensive to give the benefits they enjoy up to
individuals they perceive as “others,” or non-natives. Therefore, the
strength of the welfare state has implications for the level of antiimmigrant sentiment, which is indicated by the electoral success of radical
right parties. If my hypothesis is correct, the welfare chauvinist approach
used by the radical right to mobilize voters should be effective in strong
welfare states, but not weak ones.
Research Design
Because I’m relying on secondary data-sets, the conceptualizations
of my variables are tailored more closely to those data sets than they might
have been otherwise. The independent variable, the amount of social
spending in a country, is conceptualized as the percentage of a state’s GDP
spent on these services. This data is available from the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development. For the purposes of this
research, I’ll be looking specifically at the year 2014 (the most recent year
European Parliamentary elections took place). Though private sector social
expenditure is also represented in this data, I will not be taking it into
account, as I’m seeking to identify only the government resources and tax
dollars that are being fed into these programs. This is because social
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expenditure from the private sector is less likely to incite resentment
towards “outsiders” and welfare chauvinist attitudes, which mobilizes
voters to support radical right parties. Since the Organization of Economic
Co-operation and Development provides the best representation of this
data, my research design is also limited to the countries comprising their
analysis. This precludes most non-European nations, though there are
exceptions, such as the United States, Canada, Japan, and Mexico.
However, because I’m comparing this data with European Parliament
elections, my design is based only on the European states included in the
OECD data-set. The OECD’s definition of social spending is the following:
“Social expenditure is the provision by public (and private*)
institutions of benefits to, and financial contributions targeted at,
households and individuals in order to provide support during
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the
provision of the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a
direct payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract or
transfer.”
The data presented by the OECD effectively indicates the size of
the welfare state within each given country. Based on my hypothesis,
states with larger welfare expenditures should have prominent radical right
presences.
The dependent variable, the success/failure of radical right parties
within states, is conceptualized using data from the European Parliament.
The Parliamentary data reflects the votes gained by Radical Right parties in
these elections compared with other national parties, and therefore
indicates the willingness of the population of a given state to vote for the
far-right and the success of these parties in domestic politics. It’s worth
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noting that turn-outs for these elections varies across the scope of nations
represented in the data: for example, while turnout in Belgium was almost
90% in the 2014 election, turnout in Slovakia was only 13%. Due to the
necessity of including these nations in the analysis despite their low voter
turnout, I’ve not precluded them from the intended research. However, the
varying turnouts might affect the conclusions ascertained using this model.
To account for this, I will control for each state’s given “political
participation” level on the democracy index from the Economist
Intelligence Unit in 2014.
Also to be considered is that election results in the European
Parliament are often different than those in national parliamentary
elections. While some radical right parties might perform exceptionally well
in European Parliament, their showings in national elections might be
weaker, and vice versa. This is a necessary trade-off; by using the data from
the European Parliamentary elections, certain variables (such as the year
they were conducted) are consistent across the countries represented in
the data. Finally, due to the nature of my sources, my analysis will be
confined to nations that are both members of the OECD and the European
Union. Although it does risk missing potentially valuable data, limiting the
scope is ultimately beneficial to the model. By focusing on only EU nations,
variability across political systems (such as multi-party versus two-party)
plays a lesser role in determining the success of the far right, as the bulk of
EU nations use a system based on proportional representation, often
thought to be conducive to multi-party competitive elections. By evaluating
the effect of the independent variable of social spending on the dependent
variable of radical right representation through quantitative data sets, a
substantive correlation might become apparent.
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Because high levels of ethnic heterogeneity prevails in the
literature as being strongly correlated with large welfare expenditures, I’ve
included a second analysis controlling for the percentage of the population
comprised of immigrants in each state included in the model. This data is
sourced from the 2014 Eurostat.
Results
I conducted an Ordinary Least Squares Regression to determine
whether or not a positive correlation exists between the percent of a
state’s GDP spent on social services (the independent variable) and the
vote share received by Radical Right parties from each state received in
European Parliamentary elections (the dependent variable). The sample
size consisted of seventeen states in total, predominately in Western
Europe, but with some from Central and Eastern Europe as well.
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The OLS demonstrates that the percentage of GDP used on social spending
within a state can account for 37.6% (.376 r-square) of the variance in the
success of the radical right in European Parliament. Based on the output
data, a one unit change in the independent variable would result in a 1.208
unit change in the dependent variable. Despite the low r-squared value, I’m
able to reject my null hypothesis due to the low p-value (.005).
In light of my low r-squared value, I added two additional
explanatory variables to my model using a multiple linear regression in an
attempt to improve it. The first added variable was the rating of political
participation according to a democracy index. My thinking was that low
levels of political participation might contribute to greater success of
radical right parties, as voters on the more extreme margins of the political
spectrum might be generally more inclined to make their voices heard. A
low political participation rating would indicate a blow to the turnout of
more moderate voters, but would not necessarily indicate the deterrence
of radical voters. The second added variable is the percentage of the
population in a given country comprised of immigrants. In testing this, I
gauged the applicability of the “ethnic heterogeneity” hypothesis on radical
right successes, contesting Stockemer’s claim that the number of
immigrants in a country has little correlation with the success of its radical
right parties (Stockemer 2015).
Ultimately, controlling for both of these variables did not improve
the model. Although it increased the r-squared value marginally, neither
variable proved statistically significant in refuting the null hypothesis
associated with them.
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Conclusion
In carrying out this research, I was able to accept my hypothesis.
High social spending in a state correlates with a larger radical right
presence elected to governing bodies, though significant reservations
remain. The relatively small number of cases included in the model
impedes its potential explanatory power. Those researching the radical
right going forward would benefit from looking at a more vast body of
states, perhaps extending their scope beyond Europe. Although this data
included some Eastern European states, it was heavily dominated by those
in the West; research in this area going forward would benefit from
extending the scope beyond Western and Central Europe, especially as
Eastern European states continue to experience higher rates of
immigration due to the current refugee crisis.
Furthermore, those seeking to build on this body of research would
do well to incorporate the percentage of immigrants not from other EU
member states as a control variable; even though I sought to evaluate
immigration as a factor for determining the success of the radical right, it
seems likely that the origin of immigrants is more likely to explain welfare
chauvinist attitudes than immigration levels themselves. The Welfare
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Chauvinism hypothesis is particularly applicable when individuals perceive
immigrants as “others”, rather than those from countries they perceive as
culturally similar. Additionally, rather than using ‘percent of population’
made up of immigrants, it would be beneficial to include the percent
increase or decrease over the course of multiple election cycles to better
establish the effect of immigration levels on radical right success.
This research presents an important theme in radical right rhetoric
used to mobilize voters. As these parties continue to gain traction in light of
concerns of citizens in regard to the economic impact of immigrants
entering their native state, scholarly attention toward these institutions will
likely remain significant. As radical right parties go on to accumulate more
credibility and clout in governing bodies, gaining the predictive power to
recognize the factors consistent with their success will be critical.
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Appendix A
Vote share: European Parliament
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en)
Percent GDP social spending: OECD social expenditure database
(http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm)
Percent immigrant population: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat)
Political participation democracy index: democracy index 2014 (eiu.com)
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Appendix B
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Fear, Confidence, and Corporal Punishment: An Analysis of
Potential Factors Impacting Death Penalty Support Among
Americans
Danielle Austen, Virginia Commonwealth University

It is perhaps the most severe exercise of power to legally take a
person’s life in the name of justice. It is written in the 8th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution that cruel and unusual punishment shall be
prohibited. However, the subjective interpretation of what constitutes
“cruel” and “unusual” punishment has created more questions than
answers. For instance, some suggest that the cocktail of drugs administered
to numb, paralyze, and stop the heart could be considered cruel and
unusual. Others say the same for the electric chair.
These

contentions

do

not

account

for

the

unintended

consequences of a botched proceeding. It is also potentially cruel to issue a
death sentence for an accused individual who was, in fact, innocent, as any
error on the part of the state would be irrevocable. It is no small wonder
that the most expensive aspect of the death penalty process is the system
of lengthy appeals, which is intended to reduce the chance of irrevocable
error. There is also real concern that the death penalty is severely skewed
against minorities. However, many Americans believe that capital
punishment helps to deter crime and reduce community deaths. Of all of
the Western industrialized nations, the United States of America stands
alone in its exercise of capital punishment.
Over the past several decades, popular opinion regarding the death
penalty in the U.S. has been positive. Its use remains an option both
federally and in many states, and continues to thrive in some of the more
75

Danielle Austen________________________________________________________________________

punitive southern states. By understanding more about the trends of
death penalty support, Americans can discover why this practice remains in
the U.S. Moreover, death penalty findings in this area may have practical
implications. The more we understand about the demographics of death
penalty support amongst Americans, the better we can engage and
educate specific groups on the policy’s ineffectiveness and unequal
application.
For the purposes of this paper I will use the terms “capital
punishment,” “death penalty,” and the abbreviation “DP” interchangeably.
Similarly, I will use the terms, “spanking,” “corporal punishment,” and the
abbreviation “CP” interchangeably.
This study utilizes secondary data from the General Social Survey
(GSS), a non-government entity that attempts to understand public opinion
about far-ranging topics of national interest. In the context of this research,
I am concerned with the factors that lead individuals to approve or
disapprove of the application of the death penalty for convicted murderers.
While I acknowledge that there are likely a number of plausible factors that
have influenced the continued death penalty support (DPS) for convicted
murderers in the United States, my research focuses on three: support for
corporal punishment of children, fear of crime, and lack of confidence in
the judicial system.
Literature Review:
Death Penalty Support (DPS)
Relevant literature regarding public support for capital punishment
confirms that certain demographic traits can predict the likelihood of
individuals’ death penalty support (DPS). Barkan and Cohn (1994)
researched why white individuals are more likely to support the death
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penalty than black individuals by measuring antipathy and negative racial
stereotypes as a predictor of DPS, using the 1990 General Social Survey.
These researchers asked questions concerning the extent to which
respondents negatively stereotyped black people to be lazy, unintelligent,
etc. They found positive correlations between white respondents who are
antipathetic toward blacks (P≤.001), hold racial stereotypes (P≤.01), and
have high DPS. Support was also significant in association with
conservativism and lower levels of education.
Soss, Langbein, and Metelko (2003) examined survey data from the
1992 American National Election Study (ANES) and 1990 U.S. Census and
found the strongest positive relationship between DPS (P≤ .01) and
prejudiced white individuals who also tested as more authoritarian. They
also found statistically significant relationships (p≤.05) to DPS between
white respondents with low interpersonal trust and white individuals who
had a high trust in government
In the two studies above, by Barkan and Cohn (1994) and Soss,
Langbein, and Metelko (2003), there was a significant split in responses
that were dependent on the race of the respondent. In these studies, the
majority of DP proponents were white (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko); 82.8
percent of whites supported the DP in comparison to only 55.5 percent of
black respondents.
Authoritarianism
Research has shown that those who exemplify authoritarian
personalities may also be more prone to support the death penalty.
Altemeyer’s (1981) research into this topic was nothing short of
groundbreaking. His research dealt with individuals’ inclinations for the
following

dimensions:

“submissiveness
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to

authority

figures,
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conventionalism, and a propensity to engage in aggression sanctioned by
authority figures,” (Benjamin, 2006, p. 924). Altemeyer developed the Right
Wing Authoritarian Scale to measure levels of support for the established
authority figures in one’s society.
Altemeyer found that “prejudice has little to do with the groups it
targets, and a lot to do with the personality of the holder” (Altemeyer, p.
24, 2006); as his research suggested, people who scored high on the Right
Wing Authoritarian Scale, RWAs, were likely to be racist as well as
politically conservative. Additionally, high RWAs were more sensitive to
perceiving danger in uncertain situations. As a whole this group of
individuals felt more threatened than most in circumstances that were
potentially

dangerous--

frequently

responding

with

aggression.

Authoritarian followers also tended to carry the trait of aggression when
supported by numbers and when acting in name of the established ideals
of a recognized authority (e.g., in a lynch mob, war, or capital punishment).
This was supported by the fact that these people advocated for much
longer incarceration lengths than the average citizen in every category of
crime, and as a group tended to strongly support capital punishment,
especially as applied to people against whom they were prejudiced. This
was because RWAs strongly believed in the “beneficial effects of
punishment” (Altemeyer, 2006, p.23) and were particularly repulsed by
criminals, thereby treating crime more seriously than most.
Fear of Crime
There are inconsistent findings regarding whether the fear of crime
correlates with increased DPS. Studies conducted by Unnever (2010) and
Lacey and Soskice (2015) suggest that there is a link between increased
support for capital punishment and an individual’s history of victimization.
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A person who had previously been a victim of crime would be more likely
to approve of extreme measures of punishment on criminals, possibly due
to a victim’s strengthened fear of crime. The GSS measured this variable by
asking whether people are afraid of walking alone within a mile of the
respondent’s location (at the time of the survey) at night. The logic behind
the suspected relationship between DPS and fear of crime was best
described by Unnever (2007). In his article, “A liberal is someone who has
not been mugged,” Unnever followed the logic that someone who had
never been the victim of a crime may be more sympathetic to criminals,
and that once the person is attacked he will be forced to confront the
reality of crime. In other words, this crime would prompt one to reevaluate
whether criminals are truly “‘victims of society’ as opposed to architects of
their own fates” (p. 314). Unnever used the GSS for several different time
periods and found that past victimization had no effect on DPS and that the
fear of crime on DPS was weak, but that past victimization was positively
correlated with opposition to preferential treatment of blacks. These
results suggest that past victimization may be more closely related to a
person’s racial biases than DP support. In Stack’s (2000) study, five
indicators for crime salience were measured to determine if people who
were past victims of crime, had a fear of crime, or were punitive were more
likely to support the DP. The only variable that was significant was
punitiveness, as it positively correlated with increased DPS. The Barkan and
Cohn (1994) study only revealed a positive, weak relationship between DPS
and fear of crime, as measured using the same question as the indicator for
fear in this study.
Other research, such as Keil and Vito’s (1991), found a positive link
between fear of crime and DPS. In their survey of 619 Kentuckian
79

Danielle Austen________________________________________________________________________

households in 1989, they measured perceived neighborhood safety and
DPS. They found that the majority of Kentuckians locked their doors (70%),
did not think break-ins were a big problem (52%), and felt safe walking in
their neighborhoods in the evening (70%). Kentuckians were also largely
supportive of the death penalty (71%) and supported the DP if involved
more than one person (76%), drugs (76%), and was premeditated (84%).
They also found that a number of variables (i.e., being old, black, female,
and having a low level of education) directly influenced fear, which in turn
significantly affected individuals’ death penalty attitudes. People who had
been victimized in the past year were also likely to have fears about the
safety of their neighborhoods, and the more residents felt unsafe in their
neighborhoods, the more likely they were to be punitive. Keil and Vito also
found that blacks and women were less likely to support the DP, which
checks out with the previous research on the demographics of DPS. In
summary, there was inconclusive evidence that fear of crime positively
correlates with DPS, which suggests that fear could be an indirect factor in
support for capital punishment.
Low Confidence in Courts and Legal System
Before delving into the relevant research on the relationship
between confidence in the judicial system and DPS, a word of caution is in
order. The concepts of confidence in the judice system and legal system
and trust in the government go hand-in-hand, and it follows that a person
who is paranoid that their government is too easy on criminals would likely
not have much trust in the judicial system. However, the relationship
between trusting the government and having interpersonal trust may not
be as clear. If a person has a high level of trust in the government, he may
or may not have a high level of interpersonal trust. Consider the RWA’s
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unwavering acceptance of authority combined with distrust (e.g.,
prejudice) of other races. Thus, the meaning of “trust” depends on the
context of the science in which it is presented.
One of the most influential studies on the relationship between
confidence in the judicial system and DPS was done by Messner, Baumer,
and Rosenfeld (2006). They studied the GSS responses between 1980 and
2002 and measured citizen confidence in all three branches of the
government and support for the DP to determine if DPS effects were
moderated in states that had high vigilante historical context (had
significant histories of lynching). They found there was a link between
attitudes about the DP and American vigilantism in that the DP “facilitates
the embrace of harsh forms of punishment as a communal ritual in the
service of victims” (p. 582), and this tended to be higher among white
Americans, as they had low interpersonal trust and high anti-black
prejudice (P≤.05). Government distrust was statistically significant for both
whites and black; however, whites who distrusted the government were
more likely to support the DP, and blacks who distrusted the government
were less likely to support the DP. Although they found that government
distrust was not moderated by regional factors, they saw an increase in the
overall likelihood of DPS in whites of states with high vigilante historical
context, which increased proportionally to DPS as it was influenced by
other predictors (i.e., sex, income, education, racism, and religiosity).
This is important because it implies that there may be a racial
component that factors in to distrust in the government. To southern
whites, distrusting the government may stem from the skepticism that
murderers who serve life without parole may not have to serve their whole
sentences and are often privy to amenities such as free healthcare and
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recreational activities (Messner, Baumer, & Rosenfeld, 2006). Supporting
capital punishment, therefore, may give white individuals a sense of power
while reducing the discretion of potentially lenient government officials. On
the other hand, blacks who were distrustful of the government were
significantly less likely to have high DPS, as they did not wish to give more
power to an institution that they did not trust, especially when the price
was death. Ultimately, the takeaway was that confidence in the
government had a significant influence on DPS for both whites and blacks.
In order to discern the reasons behind this phenomenon, more research
should be conducted to isolate the variables that are modulating these
effects.
Corporal Punishment
Altemeyer’s (2006) research on RWAs found that they also strongly
supported keeping with traditional social customs that had been deemed
acceptable. For example, strong RWAs would still likely support the usage
of spanking as a traditional form of child discipline. High RWAs are also
more likely to support corporal punishment, especially if it involved a child
breaking the law, due to their tendency to conform to conventional
customs, a propensity for authoritarian aggression, and an unwavering
support of established authorities.
There was strong evidence to support the claim that people who
were likely to use or favor corporal punishment on children were also likely
to support the practice of capital punishment (for adults). Altemeyer’s
(2006) research posits that people who scored high on his RWA test
(authoritarian followers) shared three distinct traits to a high degree:
submission to an established, legitimate authority of the society,
aggression in agreement with the goals or ideals of the authorities, and
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conformity to conventional norms and customs (p. 9). Thus, people who
were high RWAs tended to support capital punishment as well as corporal
punishment, as they share the classification of “socially sanctioned
violence,” as studied by Anderson and Bushman (2002, p. 127). Benjamin’s
(2006) research using the Attitudes Toward Violence Scale and the RWA
Scale found a strong positive association between authoritarianism and
attitudes toward “war (r = .43, p < .001), penal code violence (r = .26, p =
.002), and corporal punishment (r = .33, p < .001)” (p. 925), as well.
Other research, such as that done by Anderson et al. (2006) and
Straus (2001) showed that there is a culture of violence that feeds into our
system of punishment that legitimizes the use of physical punitive
measures. Anderson et al. found that respondents’ support for violence
was positively correlated with being physically violent, and that attitudes
about war, corporal punishment, and penal code violence were highly
related, and all categorized as “socially sanctioned violence” (p. 127). War,
corporal punishment, and capital punishment are all ways in which
humans, by way of governmental or social institutions, dehumanize others
by denying them basic rights (i.e., the right to life or right not to be
harmed) for the sake of safety, order, and compliance. Since sanctioning all
three of this type of socially-tolerated violence is a rarity among the
majority of nations in the Western hemisphere, I expect that this research
is only narrowly generalizable, in that it is only relevant among the
countries which have not yet abolished capital punishment (i.e., the United
States).
Straus’ theoretical approach known as Cultural Spillover Theory,
stated that “violence in one sphere of life tends to engender violence in
another sphere” (p. 137). Anderson et al.’s “socially sanctioned violence,”
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(p. 127) was derived from Anderson and Bushman’s (2002) research that
upstanding people in society were able to sanction extremely violent and
terrible acts like murder and torture if they could morally justify their
actions. Supporters of corporal punishment may apply a similar logic
towards the spanking of children. The compelling totality of research done
by Anderson et al. (2006), Straus (2001), and Bushman (2002) can be
summed up as follows: cultural approval of corporal punishment and the
socialization of violence was cyclically carried forth from one sphere of life
(i.e., domestic life) to another (i.e., civilian life), and it was evidenced in the
continued acceptance of capital punishment as an acceptable method for
solving problems.
Theory and Hypotheses:
This study analyzed the effects of individuals’ fear of crime,
confidence in the judicial system, and support of corporal punishment on
support of capital punishment. Conventional wisdom suggested that fear of
crime was positively associated with increased DPS, but the relevant
literature supporting this relationship has been inconsistent. When
isolating the specific variables of the population and analyzing the effects,
(i.e., age, prejudice, and education), I expected to see older people being
more fearful of crime, which would in turn increased DPS. I also suspected
that increased anti-black prejudice was associated with high fear of crime,
thus increasing DPS. In theory, people who were prejudiced against black
individuals primarily attributed “criminal activity” to blacks. I also predicted
that education played a role in the relationship between fear of crime and
DPS, with fear being mediated by high levels of education. For confidence
in the judicial system versus DPS, I suspected that this association would
also be positive as long as whites and blacks were considered separately, as

84

Fear, Confidence, and Corporal Punishment: An Analysis of Potential Factors Impacting Death Penalty
Support Among Americans

the literature suggests confidence in the judicial system is heavily
influenced by race, albeit for very distinct reasons.
I also considered political ideology to be a mediating factor, as the
literature had suggested that conservatives were more likely to advocate
for harsher sentences. Lastly, I was expecting that support for corporal
punishment, authoritarianism, and fundamentalism were positively
associated with DPS. Further, I hypothesized that supporters of corporal
punishment would be more likely to support the DP, in that people who
can rationalize the use of socially sanctioned violence on children will also
use that reasoning to support capital punishment. I also measured
authoritarianism and fundamentalism as interacting variables, since these,
in part, constituted the foundation of personal core beliefs that could
positively impact DPS, as suggested in the literature. Figure 1 depicts the
predicted model for all of the variables (independent and covariates) as
they work on each other to ultimately impact DPS. Table 1 outlines the
hypotheses of this study.
Methods and Operationalization:
This study used the GSS, an annual social survey that has been
administered since 1972. This research is limited by the years that certain
variables are available (1998 and 2008). Each variable in this study has
been operationalized using one GSS question each. Fear of crime,
confidence in the courts and legal system, and support for corporal
punishment were the independent variables.
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Figure 1: Model of covariates mediating each independent variable. Low education and high
prejudice mediate fear as it impacts DPS. Being white and conservative mediate the
relationship between confidence and DPS. Authoritarianism and fundamentalism work on
CP support, which acts on DPS.

Fear of crime has been conceptualized as a person, due to past
history of victimization, perceptions of crime in his area, being elderly, or
something else, who expresses a high level of concern for personal safety,
property damage, or theft. This variable, FEAR, was operationalized using
the question, “Is there any area right around here--that is, within a mile-where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?” and coded as 1 = no
and 2 = yes.
Confidence in the judicial system was conceptualized intuitively
and operationalized as, CONCOURT, “How much confidence do you have in
Courts and the legal system [?]”. Answers ranged from “no confidence at
all,” “very little confidence,” “some confidence,” “a great deal of
confidence,” and “complete confidence” and were coded 1-5, respectively.
Support for corporal punishment was conceptualized as favoring
physical punishment in the form of spanking or hitting for non-injurious
behavioral correction on children. It was operationalized using the
question, SPANKING, “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
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disagree that it is sometimes necessary to discipline a child with a good,
hard spanking?” Responses were coded as “strongly disagree” = 1,
“disagree”

=

2,

“agree”

=

3,

and

“strongly

agree”

=

4

Table 1: Hypotheses as Mediated by Intervening Variables
HA1: As fear of crime increases, DPS HO1: As fear of crime increases, DPS
increases.
does not increase.
HA2: Among older people, fear
HO2: Among older people, fear and
and DPS is positively associated.
DPS is not positively associated.
HA3: Among highly educated people, HO3: Among highly educated people,
fear and DPS is negatively
fear and DPS is not negatively
associated
associated.
HA4: Among racially prejudiced
HO4: Among racially prejudiced
people, fear and DPS is positively
people, fear and DPS is not
associated.
positively associated.
HA5: As confidence in the courts and HO5: As confidence increases, DPS
legal system increases, DPS
does not increase.
increases.
HO6: Among whites, confidence and
HA6: Among whites, confidence and
DPS is not positively associated.
DPS is positively associated.
HO7: Among conservatives,
HA7: Among conservatives,
confidence and DPS is not positively
confidence and DPS is positively
associated.
associated.
HA8: As support for corporal
HO8: As CP support increases, DPS
punishment increases, DPS
does not increase.
increases.
HO9: As authoritarianism increases,
HA9: As authoritarianism increases, DPS does not increase.
DPS increases.
HO10: As fundamentalism increases,
HA10: As religious fundamentalism
DPS does not increase.
increases, DPS increases.
HO11: Among authoritarians, CP and
HA11: Among authoritarians, CP and
DPS is not positively associated.
DPS is positively associated.
HO12: Among religious
HA12: Among religious
fundamentalists, CP and DPS is not
fundamentalists, CP and DPS is
positively associated.
positively associated.
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The dependent variable, support for capital punishment was
conceptualized as believing that government execution of murders should
be allowed, and it was operationalized as, CAPPUN, “Do you favor or
oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?” Responses
were coded as “oppose” = 1 and “favor” = 2. A better question for this
variable could have asked respondents to indicate strong or mild
agreement or disagreement with the use of capital punishment for murder;
however, the GSS does not have questions about capital punishment
support using this framework, so the coding of the variable has been left in
its original form.
The effects of each independent variable were analyzed using a chisquare test. Considering that past research has found certain demographic
characteristics to significantly impact on the dependent variable, this study
used controlled for other variables. This study first considered the effects
of each variable (independent variables and covariates) on the dependent
variable in a chi square test (see Figure 1). From there, each of the
independent variables was tested against the dependent variable using all
of the covariates. The covariates of this study were race, religious
fundamentalism,

political

ideology,

age,

level

of

education,

authoritarianism, and anti-black prejudice.
Race was conceptualized as white or black, respectively; religious
fundamentalism as liberal, moderate, or fundamentalist; political ideology
as liberal, moderate, or conservative; age as young, middle-aged, olderaged, and elderly; level of education as highest level last completed;
authoritarianism as exemplifying Altemeyer’s (1981; 2006) classifications of
a RWA by favoring socially sanctioned violence (i.e., spanking so that that

88

Fear, Confidence, and Corporal Punishment: An Analysis of Potential Factors Impacting Death Penalty
Support Among Americans

children would obey their authorities); and anti-black prejudice as
individual perceptions of blacks’ intelligence as a group.
Race was operationalized using the question, RACE, “What race do
you consider yourself?” and coded as black = 1 or white = 2. This study was
only interested in the potential split of racial prejudice and attitudes as it
deals with the historically antagonistic groups of whites and blacks that
may have effects on their DPS; thus people reporting as “other” had been
omitted. Religious fundamentalism was operationalized using the GSS
question, FUND, which asked respondents several questions to assess
individuals’ level of religious fundamentalism. It was coded as “liberal” = 1,
“moderate” = 2, and “fundamentalist” = 3. Political ideology was assessed
using the question, POLVIEWS, “I'm going to show you a seven-point scale
on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely liberal--point 1--to extremely conservative--point 7. Where
would you place yourself on this scale?” and re-coded with “Extrmly [sic]
conservative,” “Conservative,” and “Slghtly [sic] conservative” represented
as “conservative” = 3, “Moderate” = 2, and “Extremely liberal,” “Liberal,”
and “Slightly Liberal” as “liberal” = 1. Age was operationalized from raw
numbers corresponding to the respondent’s recorded age into the
following categories and codes: 1 as “young” for 44 years or less, 2 as
“middle-aged” for 45 years to 64 years, 3 as “older-aged” for 65 years to 74
years, and 4 as “elderly” for 75 years and older. Level of education was
operationalized using the set questions, collectively termed, EDUC, which
asked respondents to answer whether they received a high school diploma
(or the highest level completed) or college degree (or highest level
completed) and were recorded as 0 – 20, with 12 representing graduating
high school, 16 as graduating undergraduate college, and 20 as graduating
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graduate or higher education levels. The responses were recoded with the
grades 17-20 representing “highly educated” = 1, grades 13-16
representing “medium educated” = 2, and grades 0-12 representing
“poorly educated” = 3. Authoritarianism, OBEY, was measured using a
question which asks respondents to rank how important it was that a child
should learn “to obey” “to prepare him or her for life” along with several
other variables. This question had been recoded such that respondents
reported that children should obey as “most important” as 4, “2 nd
important” as 3, “3rd important” as 2, and all lower rankings as 1. This study
was interested in analyzing the respondents who answered 3 and 4 as
strong indicators of parental authoritarianism and 1 and 2 as weaker
indicators. Lastly, anti-black prejudice was operationalized using the
question, “Do people [who are black] tend to be unintelligent or tend to be
intelligent?” on a scale from 1 – 7, with 7 being “unintelligent”. The
responses were recoded to represent 1 and 2 being “not prejudiced,” 3-5
being “average,” and 6-7 being “prejudiced.” These answers were coded
this way because people who ranked all black people as a 7 (unintelligent)
would likely not differ much in terms of their level of anti-black prejudice
with people who ranked blacks as a 6. The same applies for the opposite
side of the scale, 1 or 2. Additionally, the responses of 3 to 5 were midrange selections, which probably did not have significant differences
among individuals who had certain levels of anti-black prejudice. In other
words, this study operationalized anti-black prejudice by coding individuals
as 1 for not being prejudiced against blacks, 2 as having low to average
levels of prejudice against blacks, and 2 as being highly prejudiced against
blacks. This scheme of recoding the variables was done in order to allow
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interpretation of the results as intuitive as possible (e.g., increasing levels
of authoritarianism corresponding to higher number codes).
Results:
This study had 4855 cases for the cross tabulation between DPS
and each of the three independent variables; fear of crime, support for
corporal punishment, and confidence in the courts and legal system. Each
independent variable was analyzed using a cross tabulation with the
dependent variable and tested for significance using chi square as well as
association via gamma. See Table 2.
Fear of Crime
There were 2,964 valid cases using fear and DPS as variables. Based
on these specific conceptualizations, the majority of people did not have a
fear of crime (62.2%), while 37.8 percent of people did. Of those who
feared crime, 68 percent favored the DP and 32 percent were opposed. Of
those who favored the DP, 36.6% were fearful, while 63.7 percent were
not. These results were weakly associated in the negative direction (P≤.009,
γ=-.108), in that as fear of crime increases, DPS decreases. HO1 failed to be
rejected.
This study went deeper into analyzing several other covariates or
interacting variables that could explain these findings. Fear of crime was
analyzed using age, anti-black prejudice, and level of education as the
primary controls also using the chi square test of significance and the
gamma test of association. The interaction between fear and age does not
have a statistically significant impact on DPS; therefore, HO2 failed to be
rejected.

91

Danielle Austen________________________________________________________________________

Table 2: Variable Interactions on DPS
Variable Interactions

Chi Square
Value

Chi Square
Significance

Gamma
Value

Fear*DPS

6.872

.009**

-.108

[Fear*Age]*DPS

3.254

.354

-.066

[Fear*Education]*DPS

8.232

.016*

-.111

[Fear*Prejudice]*DPS

7.164

.306

-.115

Confidence*DPS

3.615

.461

.025

[Confidence*Race]*DPS

71.846

.000***

.240

[Confidence*Ideology]*DPS

120.975

.000***

.197

CP*DPS

65.751

.000***

.225

Authoritarianism*DPS

8.563

.036*

.087

Fundamentalism*DPS

2.108

.348

.040

[CP*Authoritarianism]*DPS

22.691

.007**

.165

[CP*Fundamentalism]*DPS

28.214

.000***

.128

*P≤.05, **P≤.01, ***P≤.001
Note. Of the main independent variables, only fear of crime, support for corporal
punishment, and authoritarianism were statistically significant in their relationships with
DPS. Fear was weak and negatively associated with DPS, and CP support and
authoritarianism were positively associated with DPS to a moderate and weak degree,
respectively. The single strongest association was found to be between the interaction
variables of confidence and race on DPS.

There were 2,949 valid cases available to analyze the interaction
between fear, DPS, and education level. Among all levels of education, the
percentage of people who favored the death penalty was 70 percent ±1.
Fear was highest among people with medium education (38.9%) as
opposed to poor education (37%) and high education (37.1%). Education
level interacting with fear was found to have a weak, negative effect on
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DPS (P≤.016, γ =-.111). Thus I rejected the HO3. The variables of anti-black
prejudice interacting with fear were found to have a statistically
insignificant effect on DPS; thus I failed to reject the HO4.
Confidence in the Courts and Legal System
Confidence was found to be statistically insignificant on DPS; thus
HO5 failed to be rejected. The interaction variables that were tested on the
relationship between confidence and DPS were race and political ideology.
There were 2,202 valid cases for the interaction of confidence, DPS, and
race. Among those who favored the DP, whites were more likely to have no
confidence (5.3%) and little confidence (16.3%) in the judicial system than
blacks (4.5% and 11.9%). However, when considering all people, regardless
of their position on the DP, blacks were more likely to have no confidence
(10.3%) or little confidence (24.8%) than whites (6.9% and 20.7%). Whites
who favored the DP were more likely to have some confidence in the
judicial system (36.9%) than blacks who favored it (19.7%). Race interacting
with confidence was found to have a moderately positive effect on DPS
(P≤.001, γ=.240), in that as the combined interaction of race and
confidence increased (i.e., as respondents reported being white and having
high confidence in the judicial system), support for the death penalty
increased. Thus I rejected the HO6.
There were 2312 valid cases for analyzing the interaction between
political ideologies, confidence, and DPS. Among those who favored the
DP, a higher percentage of conservatives reported some confidence in the
judicial system (38.5%) than either liberals (25.3%) or moderates (36.9%).
Among the DP supporters, moderates were more likely to have no
confidence (6.1%) than liberals (3.7%) or conservatives (5%), and
conservatives were more likely to have less confidence (15.6%) than
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liberals (13.7%) or moderates (15%). Political ideology interacting with
confidence was found to have a weakly positive effect on DPS (P≤.001,
γ=.197), in that as the combined interaction of political ideology and
confidence increased (i.e., as respondents reported being more
conservative and having high confidence in the judicial system), support for
the death penalty increased. Thus I rejected the HO7.
Corporal Punishment Support, Authoritarianism, and Fundamentalism
There were 2,932 valid cases using support for corporal
punishment and DSP as variables. More people agreed (47.7%) or strongly
agreed (26.6%) with the use of corporal punishment than disagreed
(19.2%) or strongly disagreed (6.5%). Of those who agreed or strongly
agreed, 74.7 percent and 79.3 percent favored capital punishment,
respectively. The highest percentages of people out of the total belonging
to any combination of groups were favoring the DP and agreeing with CP
(35.6%), followed by favoring the DP and strongly agreeing with CP (21.1%).
The relationship between CP and DPS was moderate and positive (P≤.001,
γ=.225), in that as support for corporal punishment increases, DPS
increases; therefore, HO8 was rejected.
This study also looked at authoritarianism and fundamentalism as
it affects DPS to determine whether one variable is better at explaining DPS
over the others. There were 3007 valid cases available to test the effects of
authoritarianism on DPS. A higher percentage of respondents who favored
the DP were not authoritarian (52.5%), whereas the percentage of those
who were either highly or slightly authoritarian totaled 29.8. Of all groups,
the highest percentage of respondents were those who were not
authoritarian and favored the DP (36.5%), followed by those who were not
authoritarian who opposed the DP (17%). The relationship between
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authoritarianism

and

DPS

was

in

the

expected

direction;

as

authoritarianism increased, so did DPS. Therefore, HO9 was rejected.
However, the association level was weaker than that of CP (P≤.036,
γ=.087). This setup was replicated for fundamentalism, but the results
were statistically insignificant; thus HO10 failed to be rejected.
After determining that CP support was the best variable to analyze
DPS, two interaction variables were tested on DPS, namely CP interacting
with authoritarianism, and CP interacting with religious fundamentalism.
There were 1,487 valid cases available for analyzing the interaction
between support for corporal punishment and authoritarianism together
on DPS. Among those who ranked highest for support of CP, the
percentage of people favoring the DP increased as authoritarianism
increased (from 16%, 19.3%, 19.7%, and 23.8%). Among those who ranked
highest for authoritarianism and favored the DP, a higher percentage of
people agreed with CP (52.9%) or strongly agreed (32.2%) as opposed to
disagreeing (13.5%) or strongly disagreeing (1.4%). Most people agreed
with CP (50.4%), and of those people, 37 percent favored the DP. The
percentage of people favoring the DP was highest among people who
scored the highest for authoritarianism (74%) as compared to the others (in
order from most to least: 70.7%, 71.8%, and 69%). Authoritarianism
interacting with support for corporal punishment was found to have a
weak, positive effect on DPS (P≤.007, γ=.165), in that as the combined
interaction of authoritarianism and CP support increased, support for the
death penalty increased; thus, HO11 was rejected.
There were 2,776 valid cases available for analyzing the interaction
between support for corporal punishment and religious fundamentalism on
DPS. Among those who strongly agreed with CP usage, the percentage of
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people who favored the DP increased as fundamentalism increased (in
order from liberal to fundamentalist: 16.1%, 18%, and 24.2%). Among all
fundamentalists, the greatest percentages belonged to people who both
supported the DP and agreed with CP (36.1%), followed by people who
supported both the DP and strongly agreed with CP (24.2%). Religious
fundamentalism interacting with CP support was found to have a weak,
positive effect on DPS (P≤.001, γ=.128), in that as the combined interaction
of fundamentalism and CP support increased, support for the death
penalty increased. Thus I rejected the HO12.
Discussion:
Of all of the tests that were run, the null hypotheses for tests 1, 2,
4, 5, and 10 failed to be rejected and failed to provide support for my
alternative hypotheses. However, for the remaining tests, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,
and 12, I rejected the null hypotheses. These tests indicated support for the
following relationships. As the interaction of fear and education increased,
there was a negative effect on DPS, showing that people who were more
educated and fearful of crime supported the DP less. In other words, the
level of education that a person had had an impact on his support for the
DP, even if he was fearful of crime. This was more evidence in support of
the claim that education can trump the most primal human emotions.
Taking the interaction of increased confidence in the judicial
system and being white resulted in a net positive support for the DP.
Additionally, the interaction between political conservatism and increased
confidence in the judicial system resulted in a net positive DPS as well.
These findings were interesting because they were extremely statistically
significant associations, even though the basic association for confidence
on DPS was insignificant. It shows that confidence alone did not provide
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adequate information with which to make judgments or conclusions about
people’s DPS, but considering race or ideology with confidence did.
Knowing a person’s race was the most powerful indicator of DPS, as it
strengthened the association to a moderate level. Knowing a person’s
ideology was also important-- it aided the analysis albeit to a slightly
weaker degree.
Fundamentalism and DPS were statistically insignificant but
support for CP and authoritarianism were statistically significant. Support
for DP had a moderate positive association with DPS, and authoritarianism
was weakly positive in association. I concluded that CP support would be
better to analyze DPS among GSS respondents. The last two tests were
both highly significant, but they resulted in weaker associations with DPS.
The interaction of fundamentalism and CP support had a positive effect on
DPS, but to a lesser degree than just CP support and DPS. Likewise, the
interaction of authoritarianism and CP support had an even weaker
positive effect on DPS than the other two tests. This suggests that among
these last tests, CP support, when taken alone, was the best indicator of
DPS so far.
In conclusion, the best measured indicators for predicting DPS
include the combined score of a person’s confidence in the justice system
and race, followed by one’s support for corporal punishment. Researchers
still do not fully know everything that impacts a person’s decision to
support the DP. More research is needed to analyze other potential factors
that may play a role in a DPS.
Additionally, this research could be improved by analyzing DPS on
an ordinal scale rather than dichotomously in order to fully capture the
wider public sentiment. It is a huge limitation of this study to use the main
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dependent variable, DPS, from the GSS, as it does not allow respondents to
report degrees of support or opposition. Several other variables that were
included in this study are also dichotomous, possibly contributing to some
hypotheses being rejected when in actuality there might be evidence in
support of them. For example, race was only analyzed as respondents fell
into the categories of white and black. Other minorities were excluded
from the sample, thus the full extent of my main research question as well
as any minor research questions such as racial discrimination on DPS did
not apply to a potentially significant portion of Americans. My research can
be improved by including better, more comprehensive responses for
certain variables that were dichotomous in this study such as “strongly” or
“slightly” supporting the DP or demarcating race into detailed categories
such as “Asian American” or “Pacific Islander” rather than lumped together
into the “Other” category.
Ultimately this research is valuable because it provides insight into
the patterns that help us predict who is a likely supporter of the DP. One of
the goals of this research is that the results can be applied to real-world
solutions to reduce support for the DP. Some of the traits that were
analyzed to determine DPS form the foundational personalities of
Americans and therefore cannot be influenced in a cost-effective or timely
manner. For instance, staunch believers in corporal punishment are not
easy targets of anti-corporal punishment programs, as it permeates
throughout their religious and cultural backgrounds.. However, even
though the majority of people favor the DP, I suggest that there may be
hope for reducing DP support through increased education aimed at first
reducing public fear of crime, since there is evidence to show that
education is negatively correlated with DPS.
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Which form of transportation is the most expedient and affordable
for spatially mismatched workers in both urban centers and less populated
areas? Some argue that alternative automotive transit programs are
burdensome and impede the efficiency and effectiveness of roadways, and
that walking and bicycling are most financially practical and socially
considerate for individuals travelling long distances to and from work (TA,
“Your Advocate”). While public transportation and ride-sharing services
may be less physically arduous on travelers, the financial and
environmental penalties consistent with these services often reduce their
usefulness over long periods of time. Others assert that redistributing a
percentage of a local or state government’s road pricing revenues, which
are attained through commuter charges, gas taxes, and other vehicle
related costs, to citizens will prove most effective. By reallocating road
pricing revenues to citizens, individuals will gain additional monetary
means and incentives to drive to and from work (Rouhani et al. 2015).
Although both of these arguments explain methods that could increase
spatially mismatched employees’ use of transportation alternatives, I argue
that government subsidies of private sector transportation services such as
Uber, which call on non-employed citizens to provide transportation
services, could potentially increases workers’ accessibility to quick and
affordable transportation options. Specifically, by subsidizing citizen-run
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transportation services, more individuals gain the ability to afford these
transportation alternatives.
This is an important area of research due to the impact that
inadequate public transportation and expensive private transportation
services have on spatially mismatched individuals. If citizens do not have
access to public transportation options or do not have the financial liberty
to consistently pay for privately operated transportation services, these
citizens are forced to walk or use other inefficient transportation methods
to travel long distances. The subsidization of citizen-run transportation
systems such as Uber would vastly reduce commutes for many citizens.
This reduced travel time would allow individuals to access additional means
by which to improve their social and economic conditions. For example, a
shortened commute time would give individuals the opportunity to study
educational material, pursue additional economic avenues, and engage in
healthy lifestyle choices; these opportunities could potentially contribute
to an increased quality of life.
In addition, transportation improvements have the potential to
decrease the physical and psychological strains typically placed on
commuters, and in turn increase commuters’ productivity and efficiency at
work. In order to promote community growth and prosperity, it is
important for businesses, local leaders, and politicians to better
understand potential alternatives to the established transportation
methods available.
Literature Review
Initial advocates of public transport systems believed that an
expanded public transport system would serve two purposes: to decrease
traffic, vehicular collisions, and environmental detriments; and to increase
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both the availability of affordable transportation and the productivity of
public transportation riders (APTA, “Public Transportation Benefits”;
Mickey 2013). While many governmental bodies support public transit
improvements,

some

scholars

argue

that

different

government

transportation protocols should be used in order to generate maximum
benefits for spatially mismatched workers. Specifically, Geddes and
Nentchev (2013) argue that by charging commuters for using public roads,
especially during busier hours of the day, governments gain access to
increased funds for transit purposes. These funds, according to Geddes and
Nentchev, could then be redistributed to local residents for transportation
assistance.
While both of these arguments are logical, it is my hypothesis that
increasing the number of government subsidies to transportation services
such as Uber will yield significant socioeconomic benefits for workers and
their communities. Generally, as more workers attain higher financial
capabilities, their communities also achieve greater economic success.
Also, as Shu-Hen Chiang expresses in “The Dilemma of ‘Twin Cities’: Is the
Suburban Dependence Hypothesis Applicable?,” “people follow jobs,”
which means that stable economic conditions are required for individuals
and communities’ continued wellbeing. People will relocate if there are
more advantageous job offerings in different areas (150), which makes
accessibility a significant issue for local governments and employers.
However, in areas with lower populations and fewer financial resources,
drastically increasing the quantity or efficiency of public transportation
services is less feasible. As such, building upon established transportation
options that span large distances, such as Uber, potentially allows smaller

103

Jeff Martindale________________________________________________________________________

urban governments to provide the transportation services necessary to
maintain a sustainable workforce.
Methodology
This paper will attempt to portray a causal relationship between
subsidization of citizen-run transportation services and increased worker
productivity. In addition to examining the aforementioned arguments, I will
investigate previous attempts to subsidize privately owned transportation
services and the benefits for workers such subsidies yielded. Then, I will
analyze the methods utilized by citizen-operated transportation services
and explore the likelihood that previous similar government subsidies
yielded equitable or additional benefit for workers and local economies in
areas without adequate public transportation.
Data and Analysis
There are inherent benefits to public transportation systems in the
United States’ economic, energy, and environmental realms, and the
amount of Americans utilizing relatively inexpensive public transportation
options rose significantly over the twenty-first century. In 2014 alone,
United States citizens took roughly eleven billion trips on various modes of
public

transportation,

which

provided

substantial

health

and

environmental benefits to riders and all American citizens (APTA, “Public
Transportation Benefits”). According to the United States Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, motor vehicle traffic accidents account for
approximately thirty thousand to forty thousand deaths annually (CDC,
“Accidents or Unintentional Injuries”); yet the inclusion of public
transportation in metropolitan areas significantly reduces the number of
cars on roads, thus reducing the potential for fatal motor vehicle accidents.
Though the threat of vehicular accidents is not eradicated through the use
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of public transportation, public transit services also offer riders access to
much larger, generally safer vehicles that are less likely to be damaged
during collisions (APTA, “Public Transportation Benefits”; Mickey 2013).
In addition, public transit services reduce physical and financial
stresses for riders. Public transportation is prompt, timely, and allows
riders to travel to and from their destinations without weather constraints
or other hindrances. Driving a personal vehicle in an urban center
significantly increases the amount of gasoline needed to travel from place
to place. By offering relatively inexpensive and financially consistent fares
to riders, public transportation services allow riders to better save and
manage money (APTA, “Public Transportation Benefits”). By reducing the
stresses that are usually associated with personal transportation, users of
public transportation services attain access to opportunities to increase
their quality of life.
While the aforementioned benefits portray public transportation
services’ positive effect on riders, the economic benefits for local
communities, businesses, and the environment are also immense.
According to the American Public Transportation Association (APTA),
investment in public transportation yields financial prosperity for both
investors and local residents. For example, the APTA asserts that “every $1
invested in public transportation generates approximately $4 in economic
returns... every $1 billion invested in public transportation supports and
creates more than 50,000 jobs... [and] every $10 million in capital
investment in public transportation yields $30 million in increased business
sales.” Additionally, property values rose by an average of forty-two
percent for properties located near frequently used public transportation
hubs (APTA, “Public Transportation Benefits”). It is arguable that the
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correlation between increased capital investment in public transportation
and improved business sales is a result of the rise in worker productivity
due to access to more adequate forms of transportation. Should more
expedient and reliable transit services become available to spatially
mismatched employees, workers’ abilities to consistently reach their
workplace, without fear of travel obstacles, substantially increase.
From an environmental standpoint, public transit significantly
reduces the detrimental effects of mass personal transportation. The APTA
claims that households with personal vehicles “near public transit drive an
average of 4,400 fewer miles than households with no access to public
transit” and “public transportation use in the United States saves 4.2 billion
gallons of gasoline annually” (APTA, “Public Transportation Benefits”).
Additionally, for each commuter, switching from personal transportation to
public transit reduces a household’s carbon emissions by ten to thirty
percent annually. In the United States, public transportation reduces
annual countrywide carbon emissions by thirty-seven million metric tons,
which is “equivalent to Washington, DC; New York City; Atlanta; Denver;
and Los Angeles combined [ceasing to use] electricity” (APTA, “Public
Transportation Benefits”). As such, public transportation services certainly
assist the United States in meeting the standards necessary to address the
global detriments of global warming.
However, while public transit allow community residents to travel
to jobs that are of significant distance from their homes, this does not
necessarily mean that public transportation is a quicker option for
commuters. According to a community survey conducted by the United
States Census Bureau in 2009, the average travel time to work for public
transit riders was over twenty-five minutes (McKenzie and Rapino 2011).
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This survey shows that while public transit can expedite travel to and from
work for community residents, a significant amount of time is still required
for workers to reach their jobs. As such, it is arguable that public transit
allows workers to take jobs in areas that are further away from their
homes, but public transit remains insufficient in assisting workers reach
their workplaces if they are already spatially mismatched from their jobs
prior to utilizing public transportation services.
Furthermore, the most expansive public transportation services are
offered predominantly in heavily populated metropolitan areas. The issue
of spatial mismatches transcends urban centers, as workers across the
United States in less densely populated areas also find themselves
struggling to quickly and inexpensively travel to and from work. For
workers in less urban areas of the country, public transit is either too
scarce, inefficient, or expensive to be a beneficial solution to the issue of
spatial mismatches for residents and workers that wish to improve their
own socioeconomic conditions or achieve additional socioeconomic gains
for their communities (White 2015).
In addition to public transit systems’ inabilities to adequately
expedite the rate at which workers can travel to and from work, public
transportation services generally cost more to governments than these
services produce in revenue. For example, by early 2015, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) held a debt of
approximately nine billion dollars and required an additional three billion
dollars for public transit system maintenance (Vennochi 2015). Despite the
MBTA’s nearly twelve billion dollar requirement, Bostonians continued to
advocate for increased access to public transportation services. One large
Boston-based corporation—New Balance—also desired to build transit
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systems outside of the established routes so that the corporation could
“expand its headquarters and build retail, a hotel, a track, and [a] skating
rink in one Boston neighborhood not served by public transit” (Semuels
2015). Due to the MBTA’s budgetary limitations, coupled with New
Balance’s need to expand its infrastructure and public accessibility, the
corporation decided to build the public transit extension itself. New
Balance allocated roughly sixteen million dollars to the project and offered
to pay for maintenance to the system’s extension for at least ten years
after establishment (Semuels 2015). By working with the MBTA, New
Balance created public transportation access that benefitted the city and
the corporation, and created work opportunities for many city residents.
While New Balance’s plan potentially improves the public
transportation system in Boston for workers and local businesses, and
some scholars argue that “more public-private partnership[s] may be [the]
solution” to the problem “of growing economic disparities” between
workers using public transit (White 2015; Semuels 2015), similar projects
by other corporations are unlikely in the future. Since public transit services
are generally not overwhelmingly profitable for any single business entity,
large for-profit corporations may not see the business advantages in
assisting local transportation authorities. Additionally, public-private
partnerships such as the MBTA-New Balance collaboration are less likely in
areas outside urban centers. Businesses are unlikely to assist smaller
governments or agencies in improving public transit systems if the
businesses themselves do not directly achieve some form of financial
benefit from the transportation improvement.
Because established public transportation services in the United
States are inadequate for spatially mismatched workers, and public-private
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partnerships in public transit systems are or unfeasible for numerous
businesses, governments must pursue different policies to assist local
residents travel to and from work and other locations, especially in less
populated areas. As discussed, travelers’ reliance on fossil fuels is declining
through increased use of public transit systems and the production and
purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles. Due to these transportation
changes, as well as general currency inflation, governments’ purchasing
power—the amount of a good that an entity with a set dollar quantity can
buy—from fuel taxes is continuously decreasing. In order to address this
revenue decline, scholars such as Geddes and Nentchev advocate for a
different form of public-private partnership regarding transportation—road
pricing (2013, 1).
Road pricing consists of several different charge options including
mileage-based user fees (MBUFs) for those using public roads. Geddes and
Nentchev argue that the increased funds from MBUFs can be redistributed
as “an annual dividend payment to all households within the newly priced
region” (2013, 1). By charging all public roadway users, local residents
attain access to funds that can be used for maintaining or establishing
sustainable transportation options, whether they be public or private
transit opportunities. Furthermore, by charging citizens to use public
roadways, local residents’ stake in protecting and policing MBUF regions
increase as well. Recognizing that they will gain greater funds with
increased commuter use, local residents will work harder to ensure that
the MBUF roads are accessible and appealing to commuters through
advocacy of road use and safeguarding the MBUF areas from crime and
other safety issues. The road pricing system creates an environment in
which the citizens are themselves the owners of local roads, rather than

109

Jeff Martindale________________________________________________________________________

the simple, passive payers of transportation infrastructure through taxes.
By providing an incentive for local residents to promote adequate
transportation for commuters, travel becomes less arduous on MBUF roads
and communities around MBUF areas become safer and better policed
(Geddes and Nentchev 2013, 1-4).
MBUFs can also be altered based on the time of day so that
travelers utilizing the MBUF roads pay greater fees during high-traffic
periods. As such, commuters are incentivized to either find different routes
or travel at different times of day. Either way, it is arguable that MBUFs
decrease traffic congestion and expedite the rate at which commuters
travel to and from work (Geddes and Nentchev 2013, 3-4). For workers
without adequate transportation, and all commuters, reducing road
congestion potentially yields the opportunity for quicker travel time to and
from work or other locations through transportation services. Additionally,
if local workers without adequate transportation receive funds from
MBUFs, it is arguable that these citizens will gain the ability to individually
or collectively purchase private transportation vehicles that were
previously inaccessible. Therefore, the road pricing system offers
opportunities to increase the ability of spatial mismatched workers to
quickly and consistently reach their workplaces with reliable transportation
options.
However, depending on the population size or density of an MBUF
road’s jurisdiction, the funds that each local resident receives through
MBUFs may be small. If MBUFs are used on roads within urban centers, the
reallocation of MBUF funds to citizens may be slim, even if the MBUF
roadways generate substantial amounts of revenue. As such, it is arguable
that these funds, even if pooled together, would be insufficient for local
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residents to greatly improve or establish private transportation options. For
largely populated areas, the only realistic benefit of road pricing systems is
the potential for greater community policing and social investment in
MBUF regions. While greater social interactions and collective protection
are certainly desirable and advantageous goals for communities of all sizes,
little can be done to improve spatially mismatched workers’ access to
adequate transportation options through these endeavors.
Conversely, in less densely populated areas, the share of MBUF
funds per citizen would be greater and potentially present more realistic
opportunities for citizens to gain access to private transportation. Yet a
different issue is likely to occur from the use of MBUFs in less populated
areas commuters may completely bypass MBUF regions. If several roads
utilize MBUFs in urban centers, it becomes difficult for commuters to fully
avoid paying for road access. However, commuter road use in less densely
populated areas is generally aimed at traveling to and from more
populated areas for work, shopping, and so on. As such, the number of
available roadway options for commuters simply passing through less
populated regions are numerous. Even if commuters must travel slightly
further to bypass MBUF areas, it is likely that regular commuters will do so
to avoid consistently paying for access to certain roadways. If commuters
intend to find different routes in order to bypass MBUF roadways, local
residents will receive a smaller amount of funds from MBUF roads. In
addition, local businesses that rely on commuter traffic to generate
revenues will lose customer traffic through the utilization of MBUFs,
reducing the ability to employ several workers, spatially mismatched or
otherwise.
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Since MBUFs have not yet proved a viable option for either urban
centers or less populated areas, and public transit systems are inadequate
or inaccessible for spatially mismatched workers in nearly all regions, a
more probable transportation option that provides benefits for residents in
both urban centers and less populated areas must be determined. Solely
private transportation businesses, such as taxi companies, provide services
in many areas of different population density. In New York City, six hundred
thousand passengers used taxi services per day in 2014, which totaled 236
million passengers for the year. In addition, there were approximately fifty
thousand New York City taxi drivers in 2014 that each traveled roughly
seventy thousand miles annually, proving that taxi services were nearly
always accessible to travelers. In the same year, sixty percent of taxis were
also hybrid-electric vehicles, which reduced gasoline consumption and
carbon emissions (TLC 2014, “2014 Taxicab Factbook,” 1-11).
However, the sheer number of taxis in use in New York City, an
already highly congested area, adds to the traffic of the city. Thusly,
spatially mismatched workers are condemned to the same slow
transportation speed as public transit services. Furthermore, the charge
rate per taxi trip in New York City is two dollars and fifty cents plus “50
cents per 1/5 mile or 50 cents per 60 seconds in slow traffic or when the
vehicle is stopped” (TLC, “Metered Fare Information”). As such, spatially
mismatched workers must also pay substantial fares for each trip to and
from work. While less densely populated areas generally do not face the
same amount of traffic as urban centers such as New York City, the fares on
taxis in these areas regularly use the same fare system and, therefore, taxi
use in less populated areas remains an economically unfeasible
transportation option for several spatially mismatched workers.
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In order to alleviate the economic detriments taxi use potentially
presents for spatially mismatched workers, several governments around
the world have utilized taxi subsidies. For example, in Australia, the “Taxi
Transport Subsidy Scheme (TTSS) provides subsidised travel, allowing
approved participants to travel by taxi at half fare, up to a maximum
subsidy of $30 per trip.” However, Australia’s TTSS only provides subsidized
taxi transportation to individuals with severe medical conditions who have
been reviewed by the government agency’s “medical assessor” (TfNSW,
“Taxi Transport Subsidy Scheme (TTSS)”). With regard to the Australian
transportation subsidy system, individuals are not applicable for
government subsidies based on their sole economic condition, but through
a solely medical approach.
Taxi subsidies in the United States, “popularized as ‘user-side
subsidies’ in the 1970s, were conceived as a means for reducing the costs
of existing transportation services for the elderly and people with
disabilities by placing the subsidy funds directly in the hands of the users.”
While the original conception of user-side transportation subsidies in the
United States advocated for subsidizing transportation for only the
disabled, the pool of possible users has expanded since the 1970s. The
number of government and nongovernment agencies offering “taxi
coupons” or “taxi scrips” totaled in the hundreds in the 2010s. The userside subsidy programs utilized in the United States, which provide subsidies
to taxi users and allow the users to choose their own taxi provider, proved
advantageous for both taxi riders, the agencies offering subsidies, and
taxicab companies (TRB 2012, “Local and State Partnerships with Taxicab
Companies,” 27). For taxi users, the costs of consistently using taxi services
to travel to and from work or other locations are substantially reduced; for
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agencies offering subsidies, liabilities declined by allowing riders to choose
their own taxi provider; for local or state governments, new transportation
options are unnecessary since subsidized taxi rides offer riders with a
public good; and for taxi companies, additional customers are generated
and the companies receive the same amount of money per ride through
third party payers (TRB 2012, “Local and State Partnerships with Taxicab
Companies,” 27-28).
One example of an advantageous taxi subsidy program began in
Baltimore, Maryland in 2005 through the Maryland Transit Administration
(MTA). The program, “now called Taxi Access II, provided 286,000 [taxi]
rides in 2010 at a cost to MTA of $3.9 million excluding broker fees. Eight
taxi companies and two sedan companies in Baltimore and nearby
communities participate[d]” (TRB 2012, “Local and State Partnerships with
Taxicab Companies,” 27). The program’s original design allowed a
participant to take up to four rides a day and use taxis for rides that totaled
fifty dollars in fares or less. The riders only had to pay a three-dollar cash
total to the taxi driver per trip as well. However, as mentioned,
government transportation agencies are generally extremely strained
financially, and the MTA is no exception. In 2007, the MTA paid roughly 8.4
million dollars in fares for 382,000 taxi trips, with the average trip fare
totaling 21.91 dollars. As consequence, the MTA was forced to amend the
Taxi Access II program to allow riders to take two taxi trips per day that
totaled no more than twenty dollars per fare. The program proved
immensely advantageous for riders, but vastly too expensive for the MTA,
while the increased productiveness of riders through taxi subsidies
remained unknown (TRB 2012, “Local and State Partnerships with Taxicab
Companies,” 27).
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Another example of taxi subsidies in the United States is provided
through the City of Los Angeles. Los Angeles’ taxi subsidy program—
Cityride—“offers participants reduced costs for the purchase of rides on
City-permitted taxicabs or Cityride Dial-A-Ride services” (TRB 2012, “Local
and State Partnerships with Taxicab Companies,” 28-29). The initial Cityride
program offered participants with access to a booklet with eighty-four
dollars in coupons for various transportation options, which participants
paid five dollars to obtain. Each participant “could use up to a maximum of
$12 worth of coupons for each taxi trip” and “multiple participants riding
together could pool their coupons for a longer trip.” While the couponbased system appeared advantageous in theory, the practical use of the
coupon system ultimately proved flawed due to fraudulent practice; “for
instance, some participants would sell... coupons to their friends, and
sometimes passengers would complain that drivers had taken more than
the appropriate number of coupons for a trip” (TRB 2012, “Local and State
Partnerships with Taxicab Companies,” 28-29). Due to immense amounts of
disorganization within the system, the exact rise in rider productiveness
through the program is also unknown (TRB 2012, “Local and State
Partnerships with Taxicab Companies,” 28-29).
In addition to the inherent flaws in the Taxi Access II and Cityride
programs, both programs also solely targeted residents over the age of
sixty-five or residents with disabilities. Similarly to the Australian model,
Baltimore and Los Angeles’ user-side subsidies did not allow healthy
individuals simply experiencing spatial mismatches access to adequate
transportation options. Furthermore, these programs affected only
individuals living directly within or immediately nearby urban centers,
leaving citizens within less populated areas out of consideration for such
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services. As such, different services must be analyzed to determine if
spatially mismatched workers can benefit from privately operated
transportation services.
One transportation service that offers citizens fare-based
transportation is Uber. Uber Technologies, Inc. was founded in 2009 as “an
alternative service to taxi cabs,” which allows customers to request trips via
smartphone devices (Pilieci 2014). Employment with Uber is as easy as it is
flexible; driving positions are available to anyone with a valid driver's
license and access to a vehicle; in addition, Uber drivers can select the
times and areas that they wish to drive (Uber, “Work That Puts You First”).
As such, Uber acts as a conduit between community residents that assist
one another with their financial and transportation needs. As of April 2016,
Uber operates in over sixty countries and in or around approximately four
hundred cities and/or towns (Uber, “Where is Uber Currently Available?”).
Through the use of the Internet and the increased popularity of
Uber on both the user and provider-sides of the service, Uber potentially
offers residents from areas of all population sizes access to expedient
transportation options. However, in larger urban centers, the same issue of
traffic congestion possibly reduces the feasibility of Uber services for
spatially mismatched workers that must travel long distances quickly. Also,
in less densely populated areas, the number of Uber users may be smaller,
thusly reducing the incentive for individuals to drive for Uber as well.
Furthermore, the price of Uber services are immense, especially for
financially disadvantaged residents. The base fare price in New York City
and in several other regions of the United States is seven dollars, with the
remaining fare for a trip calculated based on time and distance. Prices can
additionally vary based on the type of Uber service a rider uses, which
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consist of UberX, UberXL, UberBlack, or UberSUV (Goode 2011; Uber,
“Where is Uber Currently Available?”; Uber, “How are Fares Calculated?”).
Again, in less populated areas, the Uber options available to riders are
likely to be fewer, potentially forcing a rider to utilize one of the more
expensive options and further reducing the feasibility of Uber as an option
for economically disadvantaged individuals.
However, increased ridership through Uber potentially offers the
opportunity for more Uber options in all regions of the United States. As
more individuals become riders of the service, an increasingly large number
of individuals with vehicles may view the expanding market for Uber
transportation advantageous enough to become a driver, thus offering
additional options and services to local residents. Yet the issue of pricing
for all Uber options remains at the forefront of this discussion. In 2015, in
an attempt to stimulate ridership with Uber, Uber Technologies, Inc. cut
fares by up to twenty percent in forty-eight United States cities. Since the
conception and establishment of Uber, several other similar companies,
such as Lyft, have been founded. The introduction of new ride-sharing
transportation services disallowed Uber to continue to charge higher fare
rates and remain competitive across the country. With increased
competition, spatially mismatched workers and all potential riders
accessed decreased Uber service prices (Huet 2015). Unfortunately, the
twenty percent fare reduction still leaves Uber services several dollars
more expensive than traditional taxicab or other private transportation
Services.
Recognizing the substantial benefit that Uber services present to
local economies through helping workers travel to and from work more
expediently and introducing new job opportunities for Uber drivers, but
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also the inherent expenses of Uber transportation, Altamonte Springs,
Florida—a town of roughly forty-two thousand residents—established a
“first-in-the-nation” Uber subsidy “pilot program.” City manager Frank
Martz claimed that he was “tired of waiting for Central Florida to move on
transit [improvements],” so Altamonte Springs began a subsidy program to
lessen the detriments of inadequate public transportation for city
residents. Martz and Mayor Patricia Bates’ program “will pay... ride-sharing
service[s] such as Lyft and Uber... up to $500,000 over the next year
[2016],” and offer “a unique municipal subsidy that covers 20% of any ride
that begins and ends in the city” and “25% if it begins or ends at the local
light rail station.” Conversely to Baltimore’s Taxi Access II and Los Angeles’
Cityride programs, all city residents and guests can access the subsidy
program by entering “the promo code ALTAMONTE in the [Uber
smartphone] app” (Sisson 2016). Altamonte Springs’ program is among the
most equitable transportation subsidy programs established within the
United States, and offers opportunities for spatially mismatched workers
and all city residents with inadequate transportation options to attain
speedy transit throughout the city.
Unfortunately, Altamonte Springs was not one of the forty-eight
cities targeted for base fare reductions by Uber (Zara 2015). As such, the
twenty to twenty-five percent fare reduction by Martz and Bates does not
significantly reduce the price of Uber or Lyft trips to an overwhelmingly
affordable price for economically disadvantaged city residents. Yet, as with
the creation of ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft in general,
Altamonte Springs’ subsidy system is still a new conception, which, if
repeated elsewhere, could potentially lessen the price of Uber or Lyft fares
to consistently affordable prices for city residents. The advent of Uber or
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Lyft subsidy programs, coupled with an increase in Uber or Lyft drivers in
both urban centers and less populated regions yields opportunities for
citizens to attain speedy and affordable transit options that otherwise
prove inadequate. Additionally, as with previous taxi subsidy programs,
Uber and Lyft drivers are less likely to care whether or not their fares are
subsidized by governments or nongovernmental actors, as they continue to
receive the same amount of money per fare. As such, increasing Uber and
Lyft subsidy programs also yields the potential for larger numbers of rides
for drivers, which would increase the feasibility for local residents to
consider Uber or Lyft as prosperous job opportunities, continuing to
increase the economic benefit for local economies.
Yet, without more research on both ride-sharing services and ridesharing subsidies, it is unknown what the actual impact of increasing ridesharing services and subsidies would be. Close examination of Altamonte
Springs’ subsidy program as a case study over the course of 2016 will surely
provide a better idea as to the extent of such subsidy programs’ impact. For
the time being, Uber and Lyft services are far too expensive and potentially
inexpedient for spatially mismatched workers in urban centers, and too
expensive and potentially inaccessible for spatially mismatched workers in
less populated regions of the United States.
Discussion of Findings
Through careful examination of previous and current public transit
services, it is clear that, in general, spatially mismatched workers have not
and do not benefit from public transportation in all regions of the United
States. The time that public transit services take to transport workers and
other citizens to and from their jobs or other areas simply shifts residents’
travel burden from a physical inconvenience (i.e. walking, bicycling, etc.) to
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a financial or time-based inconvenience. Furthermore, less populated areas
and certain urban centers do not have the infrastructure readily available
to undertake large public transit implementation or improvement projects.
Regarding road pricing programs, the benefits of MBUFs potentially
allow citizens access to greater funds but the exact amount of money each
local resident would receive from MBUFs fluctuates greatly based on a
number of variables. As such, more research is needed on the impact of
MBUFs in the form of case studies for both urban centers and less
populated areas.
Taxi and ride-sharing service subsidies continue to prove difficult
for governments and nongovernmental actors to adequately implement
and maintain. Subsidies to taxi and ride-sharing services are either too
expensive for the agencies offering the subsidies or do not provide enough
of a financial incentive to riders to become feasible options. While
Altamonte Springs’ subsidy program certainly appears to provide a fruitful
case study for further examination, this program is still in the very early
stages of implementation and does not currently offer enough information
regarding Uber and Lyft subsidies to determine if similar subsidy programs
would prove advantageous in other regions of the United States.
None of the three transportation programs/options analyzed in this
study overtly provide spatially mismatched workers with adequate,
expedient, and reliable transit opportunities necessary to improve their
work productivity and the productivity of their communities. However,
combining several of the aforementioned transportation programs into a
single transportation program would potentially alleviate governments and
workers’ issues with the current condition of transportation in the United
States. Specifically, utilizing road pricing tools to fund public or private
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transit services potentially offers opportunities for spatially mismatched
workers to expedite travel to and from work at cheaper prices than those
currently provided by public or private transportation options in both
urban centers and areas that are less populated.
If MBUFs were implemented, local or state governments would
gain access to increased funds from public infrastructures that are currently
not generating revenue. Rather than reallocating the revenue generated by
public infrastructure charges to private citizens, these funds could be
pooled in an account set aside by governments specifically to be used on
public or private transportation subsidies. Once governments receive a
significant amount of capital from MBUFs, the funds would be used to
subsidize public or private transportation services within a designated
region in a similar manner as those utilized by Baltimore, Los Angeles, or
Altamonte Springs. While the exact amount of capital the MBUFs would
generate cannot currently be known, it is arguable that the amount would
be substantially. Where Geddes and Nentchev’s idea of dividing this large
amount of capital among all residents of a certain jurisdiction potentially
only results in a small amount of capital per resident or household, pooling
these funds for a single public good would yield a greater amount of
available capital for governments to undertake larger subsidy programs. It
is arguable that the increased capital resources of transportation agencies
would allow these agencies to offer greater transportation subsidies to
spatially mismatched workers and all economically disadvantaged
residents.
In addition to making public or private transportation services
more affordable through MBUF funds, MBUFs also potentially lessen traffic
congestion on public roads by charging commuters more during busier
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hours of the day. As such, public and private transportation services gain
the ability to accelerate the rate at which they can transport riders from
one location to another, since commuters will be incentivized to travel at
different times of day or carpool to reduce the price they are charged
through MBUFs. With greater subsidies and reduced traffic congestion,
spatially mismatched workers attain opportunities to reach work and home
at quicker rates and reduced prices, thus increasing the amount of time
these individuals can spend engaging in activities other than traveling to
and from work in inadequate ways.
However, traffic congestion is a much larger issue for urban centers
than less populated areas and may not be a large factor deterring spatially
mismatched from utilizing public or private transportation services in
uncongested regions of the United States. Yet similar, and potentially
greater, benefits exist for less populated areas utilizing the MBUF subsidy
system. State governments can use MBUFs on roads that are utilized to
bypass less populated towns to funnel commuters into business districts of
less densely resided towns. Since many of these towns do not face the
extreme traffic congestion issues of big cities, adding additional
commuters, a majority of whom currently already use these towns to travel
to and from urban centers, would not overwhelmingly increase traffic in
less populated towns. As such, MBUFs could be used to assist local
businesses attract additional customers during travel times of the day,
further increasing the need for workers and productivity of local
communities. The MBUF-subsidy system offers workers in less populated
areas with affordable fare rates and businesses the opportunities to grow
financially from more commuter traffic.
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Although none of the initially analyzed transportation programs
yield great benefits for spatially mismatched workers, it is possible that
workers can attain more advantageous transportation options through
combining certain aspects of all the studied programs. More research is
needed to determine if MBUFs and ride-sharing subsidies generate benefits
to local communities, yet the current projects currently underway in
certain regions of the country, such as in Altamonte Springs, will provide
further answers in the near Future. Though there is currently no clear
answer to the question this study addresses scholars, workers, community
activists, and politicians should remain optimistic that further gains can
soon be made regarding improving spatially mismatched workers and
communities’ productivity through public or private transportation.
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are less influential in setting the
agenda than are men. Karpowitz
and Mendelberg then set out to
explore the conditions under
which women are best able to
achieve an effective voice in
deliberative forums. While prior
research has mainly focused on
the gender composition of
deliberative bodies, the authors
looked to another feature of the
political institutions wherein
deliberation occurs—namely its
decision rule. Minutes from
eighty-seven
school
board
meetings across twenty states
were evaluated to stress the
applicability of the findings (and
to amplify the external validity)
of a controlled experiment.
The authors’ findings are
nothing short of troubling, as
they suggest that women
participate significantly less than
men do in deliberative processes,
and that even when they do
participate, their involvement
carries drastically less influence
on the deliberation outcome
than their male counterparts.
However, the rate and influence
of participation varies based
upon the type of decision rule
being
employed.
More
specifically, when women are in
the minority, and majority rule is
employed (which is the most
common constellation in real
world political deliberation), they
participate and influence the
outcome
less
than
men.

The
Silent
Sex:
Gender,
Deliberation and Institutions. By
Christopher F. Karpowitz and
Tali Mendelberg (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2014)
In The Silent Sex,
Christopher F. Karpowitz and Tali
Mendelberg
establish
that
Americans are strongly in favor of
deliberative democracy. When
asked in a national survey what
they deem “the best way for
officials to learn what the
majority of people in our country
think about important issues”,
Americans’ number one answer
was town meeting, and their
second
favorite
form
of
participation in the democratic
process (after contacting a public
official directly) is to partake in
deliberative venues (p.8). The
authors point out that in order
for a deliberative forum to
democratically represent and
communicate the opinions of all
citizens equally, demographic
factors such as race and gender
should not impede on the ability
to participate. Nevertheless, the
authors assert the extent and
quality of participation in our
deliberative
processes
are
significantly manipulated by a
citizen’s gender.
The authors build on
critical mass theory, which posits
that, when women are in the
minority in a deliberative
process, they participate less and
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deliberative
processes
and
deliberative
outcomes
with
greater accuracy. In doing so, the
authors remind us that decision
processes and rules have a
significant impact upon how
citizens participate.
Despite these substantial
contributions to the gender
equality
debate
concerning
political institutions, the book has
one overarching shortcoming.
Given their findings regarding the
interaction
of
gender
composition and decision rules,
the authors suggest that “[w]hen
women are outnumbered by
men,
[one
should]
use
unanimous rule. When women
are a large majority, [one should]
use majority rule” (p.141).
However, active alternation
between decision rules due to
gender composition within any
political institution seems, at the
very least, a rather unrealistic
solution to the problem of the
gender gap in representation and
participation
in
political
institutions.
Due
to
the
unattainable nature of this
normative assessment, a fourhundred page treatise seems
overly lengthy, albeit incredibly
thorough.

Similarly, a deficit occurs even for
women who are in the majority
when
unanimous
rule
is
employed. Additionally, the
participation of men is less
impacted when they hold the
minority status within a group
than is the participation of
women
under
those
circumstances, regardless of the
form of decision rule employed in
a deliberative setting. Outcomes
of deliberation also significantly
fluctuate depending on decision
rule and gender composition.
These findings suggest that
women are not accurately
represented in the current status
quo of political institutions and
that features of those political
institutions
manipulate
the
outcomes of political deliberation
enormously.
Karpowitz
and
Mendelberg’s thoroughness in
laying out the theoretical
groundwork,
addressing
alternate
explanations,
conducting their experiment and,
finally,
underpinning
their
hypotheses with empirical data,
is
highly
impressive
and
contributes to the validity of their
research findings. Furthermore,
their novel approach of studying
deliberation by tracking the
compositional and institutional
mechanisms of interest, rather
than conducting pre- and postdeliberation surveys, allows them
to explain relationship between
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know their party affiliation, while
independents
mask
their
preference like an embarrassing
guilty pleasure. Why? Does it
matter
how
independents
identify, if they consistently vote
to the left or right, just like
partisans? Are there any larger
implications of such behavior?
Samara Klar and Yanna Krupinov
used their own extensive surveys,
and secondary survey data to
take a new and weighty look at
independent voters in the United
States.
When theorizing, Klar
and Krupinov viewed political
identification as an important
and dynamic part of an
individual’s social identity. What
these authors then establish,
however, is that partisanship is
viewed very negatively by much
of American society. Their
nationally representative surveys
show that people have highly
unfavorable
views
of
partisanship,
and
partisan
people. Most survey respondents
did not even want to live near
partisan people, and respondents
rated people as looking more
untrustworthy and unattractive if
the face was labeled as partisan
(page 79). Publicized ugly
disagreements and legislative
gridlock exacerbate this problem
by further repelling voters. The
authors reason that people hide
their preferences because of the

Independent
Politics,
How
American Disdain for Parties
Leads to Political Inaction. By
Samara Klar and Yanna Krupinov
(New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2016).
Contemporary political
scientists operate under the
understanding that independent
voters
are
often
less
consequential than commonly
thought because they vote as
consistently for their morepreferred party as do their
admittedly-partisan
counterparts. Even if these
independent voters do not
publicly identify with a party,
their undercover partisanship will
come through in the voting
booth. In Independent Politics, by
Samara Klar and Yanna Krupinov,
the authors assert that despite
the
similarities
between
independents and partisans in
their voting behavior, the
phenomenon of independents
has far reaching consequences
for American democracy.
Additionally,
political
scientists have found no notable
demographic
differences
between
partisans
and
independents
(page
4-5).
However, while they may vote
the same, and on the whole look
the same, the authors contend
that the differences between the
two groups do, in fact, matter.
Partisan voters want everyone to
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the political process. The authors
posit that this lack of desire to
publicly express ones political
leanings is very problematic for
the two major political parties.
since Democrats and Republicans
in the U.S. rely on grassroots
efforts, and citizen-to-citizen
advocacy.
This research is very
interesting, and supports a
hypothesis that once explained,
seems apparent: partisanship
often repels people, and thus is
socially undesirable. As such
people
call
themselves
independents and do not express
themselves
and
participate
politically because such behavior
would blow their non-partisan
cover.
One aspect of the
research that can be improved
upon by future researchers,
however, is Klar and Krupinov’s
measurement of political social
media behavior, which in today’s
world is highly relevant and
certainly worth exploring. To do
this the authors created their
own social media platform and
invited students from the same
University (to create a better
sense of community on the
platform) to post about political
issues. This seemed a poor
substitute for measuring activity
on platforms like Twitter and
Facebook
given
that any
constructed network will lack the
authenticity—and,
therefore,

social
undesirability
of
partisanship.
This explanation may
resonate with readers based on
their own, personal anecdotal
experiences.
Many
people
change the channel when
political attack ads come on,
eschew talking politics at the
dinner table, and hesitate to post
their political views on Facebook
even when they are confident in
their beliefs. Appearing too
political is a social taboo. Instead,
presenting
oneself
as
an
independent seems to lend an air
of
objectivity,
of
openmindedness, and of being above
the nasty business of politics.
Backed by their survey
results, the authors further
extrapolate that if people are
concealing their preferences
when they identify because of
social desirability factors, that
these same individuals are much
less likely to express themselves
in a partisan way. This may seem
plainly evident but this is the crux
of their research. Though they
may vote similarly to partisans,
independent voters are far less
likely to chat to their friends
about their political inclinations,
post to social media about
politics, wear a sticker, have a
yard sign, and will almost
certainly
not
be
found
volunteering for a campaign.
These are some of the most
functional ways to participate in
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whether we should expect the
introduction of social media to
further
exacerbate
this
democratic dilemma in the long
run.

external validity— of activity that
can be found on the most
popular social networking sites.
The authors’ reliance on
current survey samples also
leaves open the question of how
their findings concerning the
inaction of today’s independent
voters
contrast
with
independents of the past, and
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Call for Papers
Students who are interested in submitting their work for publication in The
Ramerican Political Science Review, Volume 2 (2017) are invited to do so by
emailing their paper and an abstract to vcupolijournal@gmail.com.
Papers should total 15-25 pages in length; abstracts should total roughly
250 words. The deadline for 2017 submissions is May 27th, 2017.
The Ramerican Political Science Review accepts work from all of political
science’s disciplines, including American Politics, International Relations,
Comparative Politics, Political Theory and Public Policy. We look for
research that addresses pressing political issues and that, therefore, carry
substantial normative importance. We also look for research that
approaches research questions from theoretically grounded avenues, and
for research that seeks to answer the research question in a novel, yet
compelling, methodological fashion.

Interested students may also consider submitting their work for
presentation in VCU’s annual Political Science Student Research
Conference. This conference is held during the Spring Semester each year
on VCU’s campus (see details below).
Undergraduate and junior graduate students are invited to submit
proposals to present completed research papers/projects, research-inprogress, or roundtable discussions on any topic related to the general
fields of government, international, and public affairs. Students from
colleges and universities in and around Virginia as well as national and
overseas colleagues are invited to submit proposals.
Students should be on the lookout for the call for papers in mid-February
and can contact polistaff@vcu.edu with questions.
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